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Yuanzhong Xu, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016
Supervisor: Emmett Witchel
In a modern mobile platform, apps are mutually distrustful, but they
share the same device and frequently interact with each other. This disserta-
tion shows how existing platforms, like Android and iOS, often fail to support
important data protection scenarios, and describes two systems to improve
platform-level security.
First, many data leaks in existing platforms are due to the lack of in-
formation flow control for inter-app data exchanges. For example, a document
viewer that opens an attachment from an email client often further discloses
the attachment to other apps or to the network. To prevent such leaks, we
need strict information flow confinement, but a challenge to enforce such con-
finement in existing platforms is the potential disruptions to confined apps.
We present Maxoid, a system that uses context-aware custom views of apps’
storage state to make information flow enforcement backward compatible.
Second, apps’ abstraction of data has diverged from platforms’ abstrac-
tion of data. Modern mobile apps heavily rely on structured data, and rela-
tional databases have become the hub for apps’ internal data management.
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However, in existing platforms, protection mechanisms are coarse-grained and
have no visibility to the structures of apps’ data. In these platforms, access
control is a mixture of coarse-grained mechanisms and many ad hoc user-
level checks, making data protection unprincipled and error-prone. We present
Earp, a new mobile platform that combines simple object-level permissions and
capability relationships among objects to naturally protect structured data for
mobile apps. It achieves a uniform abstraction for storing, sharing and effi-
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In modern mobile platforms, mutually distrustful apps from many dif-
ferent developers run on the same device. The platform is responsible for
protecting apps from each other, treating them as different security principals.
Despite the lack of mutual trust, apps communicate and exchange data with
each other as much as they do with the platform. Individual apps are designed
for specific functions, but many common tasks require functionality from mul-
tiple apps. For example, having an email app open an attached file using a
document viewer app requires the two apps to cooperate. Moreover, many
popular apps now provide standard services for third-party apps, such as stor-
age provided by Google Drive and user authentication provided by Facebook.
Storage and authentication have traditionally been the responsibility of the
platform, but as a result of this shift, popular service apps become essential
for supporting other apps that cannot be fully trusted.
Cross-app interactions are unavoidable because some apps provide es-
sential functions. In addition to enforcing basic isolation between apps, the
platform must mediate their interactions and enforce security policies. How-
ever, with standard security mechanisms in existing platforms, enforcing de-
sired policies on cross-app interactions is often impractical or even impossi-
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ble, because they either create burdens to developers and users or cannot be
achieved at all. Existing platforms implicitly rely on developers and users to
protect their data and determine what apps can be trusted, although in reality
apps are mutually distrustful. To demonstrate the problem, we have identified
two security challenges created by cross-app interactions.
First, inter-app data exchange increases the possibility of data leaks.
In the email attachment example, even though the email app does not inten-
tionally disclose the attachment to unauthorized parties, the chosen document
viewer might not keep it private. Our study shows that popular document
viewers often copy files to public storage which is shared by all apps; conse-
quently, any app may subsequently read and send the file’s contents to remote
untrusted parties over the network. The platform, at best, can let the user
decide whether to use the document viewer. Unfortunately, the user is often
unaware of data leaks because they are more difficult to observe than func-
tionality bugs; even if the user is aware of the risks, he or she may still use the
app in order to open a specific type of file, choosing functionality over security.
Second, apps use ad hoc data structures to represent high-level seman-
tics when they share data with each other. App-level structured data often
involve complex relationships among objects, e.g., a photo album which in-
cludes photos, some of which have textual tags. The diversity of representa-
tions and semantics forces existing platforms to enforce access control using
coarse-grained approaches, ignoring app-level semantics. An app could imple-
ment its own fine-grained checks on its ad hoc data structures, but that is
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tedious and error-prone because of the complex inter-related objects; in real-
ity, most developers simply use the platform’s coarse-grained mechanism. As
a result, apps often get more access rights than they need, which is a violation
of the principle of least privilege [Sal74]. For example, an image filter app is
often given the permission for the entire photo gallery, even though the user
only wants to process a small subset of photos. With such coarse-grained ac-
cess control, if this app is malicious or contains security bugs, the entire photo
gallery could be subject to data leakage or damage.
Existing platforms fail to adequately address the above challenges for
cross-app interactions, and often leave data security up to individual mutually
distrustful apps, resulting in serious problems [FWM+11,EOMC11,WXWC13,
GJS14]. This dissertation presents two systems that improve the security
mechanisms in mobile platforms with respect to these challenges, giving users
and developers platform-level assurance for data security.
1.1 Information flow control
The desired security policies in many cross-app interaction scenarios
involve information-flow properties, but these platforms contain insufficient
mechanism to enforce a desired policy. For the email attachment scenario, the
user would like the attachment not to be disclosed to unauthorized parties at
any time, regardless of what apps open the attachment. However, in Android
or iOS, once the document viewer is granted access to the attachment file,
there is no restriction on what it can do with this file; it can copy the file to
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public storage, send it to other apps or upload it to a remote server. Without
the ability to follow the flow of information, existing platforms pit security
and functionality against each other, imposing a dilemma on the user: choose
highly functional apps or choose better data security.
Maxoid [XW15] is our attempt to overcome the above limitation. Its
security mechanisms track the execution context of an app instance and enforce
information flow control. For example, when the document viewer receives a
sensitive email attachment, it enters a confined mode where Maxoid guarantees
it cannot further leak information about the attachment to unconfined apps
or to the network. A challenge is that näıvely enforcing strong confinement
can cause serious disruptions to existing apps, making the system unusable.
Maxoid addresses this challenge by using a technique we call custom views of
state, which creates multiple versions of data when necessary to make the con-
finement transparent. Maxoid has strong secrecy and integrity guarantees for
both the app that shares data (e.g., the email client) and the app that receives
data (e.g., the document viewer), without introducing complex programming
models.
1.2 Abstraction for structured data
Apps’ abstraction of data has diverged from platforms’ abstraction of
data. Internally, mobile apps heavily rely on structured data managed by
relational databases, such as SQLite in Android and the SQLite-based li-
brary—Core Data—in iOS. However, the platforms’ security mechanisms are
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coarse-grained and have no visibility to these structures; today, access control
in mobile platforms is a mixture of basic coarse-grained mechanisms based on
the traditional byte-stream abstraction inherited from UNIX (used for files,
pipes, etc.), and ad hoc user-level checks spread throughout different system
utilities and inter-app services. Each app presents an ad hoc API with ad
hoc access-control semantics, different from those presented by the platform
or other apps. This leaves apps without a clear and consistent model for man-
aging and protecting access to users’ data and leads to serious security and
privacy vulnerabilities.
Earp [XHK+16] is a system we propose to make platform-level secu-
rity mechanisms support apps’ abstraction of data. It exposes the relational
model as platform-level uniform APIs for both storage and inter-app services,
with structure-aware data protection. Being structure-aware means not only
supporting fine-grained object-level access control, but also faithfully captur-
ing the relationships among objects. Earp introduces capability relationships
which are implied in the app’s data model; for instance, having access to a
photo album may transitively confer access to all photos contained in it. Ca-
pability relationships also make permission management feasible and efficient
when access control is fine-grained.
Earp’s unifying data-access abstraction is a subset descriptor. Subset
descriptors are capability-like handles that enable the holder to operate on
some rows and columns of a database, subject to restrictions defined by the
data owner. Subset descriptors can also be downgraded and transferred to
5
other apps. Moreover, capability relationships require transitively computing
access rights which can be expensive, but by keeping computed access rights in
subset descriptors that are created at run time, Earp avoids recomputing them




Like traditional operating systems such as UNIX, mobile platforms
manage hardware resources, and provide common services allowing different
apps to share the device. In fact, these platforms do use UNIX-like ker-
nels—Android uses a customized Linux kernel, and iOS uses XNU, the kernel
which is also used by Darwin.
The basic security model in traditional desktop OSes is motivated by
the problem that different users may share the same machine. In this model,
users are the security principals, and the kernel has a reference monitor that
allows users to keep some of their files private while share some other files with
other users.
In contrast, a mobile device typically has only one user, but he or
she installs apps from many different companies and individual developers.
There is no guarantee that these apps are trustworthy in terms of protecting
the user’s data. In reality, buggy, curious or even malicious apps have been
causing serious security problems [HHJ+11, ZJ13]. As the principle of least
privilege [Sal74] suggests, the platform needs to limit the access to user data
and system resources for different apps, in order to reduce the amount of
potential harm done by these apps. As a result, apps become the security
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principals, and they carry different access rights to data and system resources.
Mobile platforms provide rich APIs, which include not only the inter-
faces for physical device features such as sensors and cameras, but also stan-
dard ways to manage data with certain high-level semantics, such as photos and
contact information. These semantics are typically considered as application-
level concepts in desktop OSes, but in mobile platforms they are provided as
standard platform APIs.
This chapter discusses software architecture, inter-app communication
and security mechanisms in existing mobile platforms.
2.1 Software architecture
Figure 2.1 schematically shows the software architectures of several
existing mobile platforms, with a comparison to desktop operating systems like
UNIX or Linux. From an application’s point of view, UNIX-like OSes provide
a simple abstraction. Storage and communication share a unified byte-stream
data model, with files and IPC channels such as pipes and sockets accessed via
file descriptors [RT74]. The file descriptor API is implemented in the kernel,
programs access storage and communication via system calls. The in-kernel
reference monitor enforces access control at the granularity of an entire file or
IPC channel.
Native mobile platforms. Native platforms are those where an app can

























Figure 2.1: Comparison of software architectures in UNIX/Linux, Android,
and Firefox OS.
requirement of a runtime. Although Android apps are typically written in
Java and run in the Dalvik VM (a customized Java virtual machine), they
may also include parts written in native-code languages like C and C++1,
which can directly make system calls to the kernel. Threfore, Android does
not rely on the Dalvik VM to enforce security policies.
Besides raw files, Android has other standard data storage APIs such as
databases and key-value stores. However, they are implemented as app-level
libraries such as SQLite and XML. In Android, an app runs in its own process
and has control of its entire user-level address space, so access control checks
for storage need to be done in the kernel. From the kernel’s point of view,
databases and key-value stores are just files containing unstructured bytes.
Consequently, the in-kernel reference monitor has no visibility into the internal
structures of apps’ data and cannot provide row- or column-level access control
1https://developer.android.com/ndk/index.html
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or consider inter-object relationships when making access-control decisions.
Similarly, iOS provides Core Data2, a set of structured APIs for apps to manage
and persist their data, but the structure of the data is not visible to the
privileged reference monitor.
Browser-based mobile platforms. Several modern platforms support mo-
bile apps purely written in Web code such as HTML5 and JavaScript, includ-
ing Firefox OS, Google Chrome, WebOS, Tizen, Windows Runtime Apps and
Ubuntu Touch. Their platform-level APIs expose database storage and high-
level resource abstractions such as “calender”, “contacts” and “photo gallery”
to apps; the implementation of these APIs is typically based on a customized,
UI-less browser runtime. The browser runtime enforces access control checks
for apps, since it cannot be bypassed by Web apps. Such enforcement is usu-
ally coarse-grained, e.g., at the granularity of the entire collection of contacts.
From the app’s viewpoint, a call to a platform API is more like a system call
than a traditional library call. The platform thus acts like the OS.
2.2 Inter-app communication
Modern mobile apps cooperate with each other and form an app ecosys-





Foreground communication and invocation. Existing platforms allows
a running app to invoke another app, with data attached to the invocation.
This typically brings the invoked app to foreground. In Android, the invocation
mechanism is called intents ; an intent describes an invocation, which is first
passed to Android’s Activity Manager Service and then routed to a suitable
receiving app. In iOS, invoking an app can be done by sending a URL that
has a scheme registered by the app. In Firefox OS, a similar mechanism is
called MozActivity.
Sharing via background services. Android supports inter-app data shar-
ing via content providers3. A content provider is an app component that imple-
ments a background service that allows apps to read and write data. Android
defines a standard, database-like API for all content providers, with operations
including query, insert, update, and delete. Data in a content provider is iden-
tified by a content URI with optional query parameters. Despite the common
API, the backend of a content provider can be implemented in arbitrary ways,
e.g., using files, databases, or in-memory data structures.
Firefox OS allows an app to define a background service with inter-app
message ports, which can send and receive JavaScript objects. Unlike Android,
it does not define standard high-level APIs for such services.




independent apps cannot directly share data via the file system or background
services. Instead, sharing often requires foreground operations and user in-
volvement (e.g., choosing a file and invoking another app to open it), even
with the app extention mechanism that allows a small set of UI elements to
interact with other apps. Sharing may also be accomplished via copying to a
system-wide shared API like the photo gallery.
2.3 Basic security model and enforcement
The security model in mobile platforms are app-centric. Apps are con-
sidered to be different principals, and the platform enforces access control in
terms of what resources an app can access.
Private and public state. A high-level way to view data stored in a mobile
platform is to differentiate private state owned by individual apps from public
state shared among apps.
Private state is the data accessible to only the owning app. An app
has full control over its private state, and can access it without explicit per-
missions. Note that although such state is private, nothing prevents the app
from intentionally sharing its data to another receiving app if this is desired,
e.g., sending via an invocation.
Allowing apps to have private state is essential to support the app-
centric security model. An app may be entrusted by the user only for a specific
task, and the user may want to keep the data related to the task private to that
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app; from the developer’s point of view, it is also desired to protect the app’s
data from being accessed by untrusted apps or competing companies. For
example, the Gmail app is expected to manage the user’s emails and access
Google account information, but not to access data owned by the Facebook
app. The two apps can simply keep their sensitive data private.
In native platforms like Android and iOS, an app’s private state is
usually a dedicated file directory, and the kernel ensures that it is by default
only accessible to the owning app—Android assigns unique UIDs to apps and
uses file permissions in Linux, while iOS uses a sandbox supported by its
kernel that can confine an app’s access to the file system. Structured APIs
like databases are provided as libraries, and they use file-backed storage; the
platform considers them as raw files when enforcing access control. In Browser-
based platforms, private state includes some HTML5 storage APIs such as
IndexedDB, and access control is enforced by the browser runtime.
Public state includes standard storage APIs available to all apps, such
as file storage on an SD card, the user’s contact list and photo gallery. Ac-
cess to such resources typically requires platform-defined permissions for the
app. Enforcement of access control is usually specific to platforms and the
implementation of these shared resources.
In fact, some shared resources are implemented in built-in apps, e.g.,
the photo gallery in Android is part of the Media Provider app. Depending on
the context, we can either think that the gallery app is part of the platform,
or that it is an app that shares data to other apps. Chapter 3 chooses the
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former interpretation while Chapter 4 chooses the latter, because they focus
on problems from different perspectives.
Permissions. Mobile platforms associate system resources with permissions.
An app carries a list of permissions that are granted either upon installation
or at run time as approved by the user. For example, an app requires cor-
responding permissions in order to access cameras, sensors, SD card storage,
photos, and contacts. Despite the significant difference among these resources,
the simple permission mechanism works for them in the same coarse-grained
manner—it simply accepts or denies any request to the resource by checking
the associated permissions without interpreting any high-level semantics.
In iOS, apps need to request permissions at run time, by showing
prompts to the user. In earlier versions of Android, permissions can only
be granted at install time. That means an app specifies a list of permissions in
its package manifest, and the user has to accept all of them in order to install
it. This design was aimed at improving user experience by avoiding permission
prompts. However, beginning in Android 6.0, apps can request critical per-
missions at run time, at the granularity of permission groups4, and the user is
allowed to revoke them. On the other hand, iOS historically requires run-time
permission granting.
Some platforms also allow an app to define its own permissions when
sharing its data to other apps. For example, an Android app can define a
4https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting.html
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content provider to serve data for other apps, but may require the other apps
to obtain a permission it defines.
Access control in Android content providers. Android’s content provider
mechanism is relatively complex, and deserves detailed discussion here. An app
can statically define permissions required for other apps to access its content
provider, specified in its manifest—an XML file that comes with the app’s dis-
tribution package. It can define read/write permissions for the entire content
provider, or separate permissions for different subsets identified by different
URI paths. However, even with path-level permissions, such permissions are
still limited to coarse-grained categories (e.g., Media Provider could use differ-
ent path-level permissions for images, audio and video, although in fact it only
uses a single permission for them all) because it is impossible to assign differ-
ent permissions to dynamically created objects, nor specify custom policies for
different client apps.
Android also has another mechanism5 for fine-grained, temporary ac-
cess granting. However, although Android calls it “URI permissions”, it is not
a way to specify or enforce security policies; instead, it can be considered a
run-time capability-passing mechanism, similar to passing a file descriptor to
another process in Linux. Android mostly uses them to involve the user in
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Figure 2.2: Android apps communicate using a content provider.
chooses an app to open it, a URI permission for this document is dynamically
passed to the receiving app.
In Android, low-level inter-process communication (IPC) is based on
Binder, a kernel-level mechanism that implements a remote procedure call
(RPC) framework for different app processes or threads to invoke each other.
Android’s customized Linux kernel contains a driver for Binder. In a Binder
connection, the client process holds a Binder reference object. Reference ob-
jects cannot be constructed by the client itself, but they can be passed to
other processes like file descriptors. Binder is used by the content provider
framework.
All running apps have been initialized with Binder connections to core
system services, such as Activity Manager Service and Package Manager Ser-
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vice, which typically run in a multi-threaded process named systerm_server.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how a client app communicates with a content
provider and how access control is enforced. The processes of these two apps
directly communicate via the Binder mechanism, on top of which Android’s
framework libraries implement the content provider interface. The client-side
interface is called a content resolver, which translates the app’s queries to
low-level Binder calls.
The content resolver first checks if a connection has been established
with the content provider. If not, it invokes Activity Manager Service to get
a Binder reference object for the content provider. Activity Manager Service
performs preliminary, optimistic permission checks—if there is any chance that
the client may be permitted to access the content provider regardless of what
operation it may use, Activity Manager Service passes a reference object to it.
If the connection has been established, the content provider is invoked using
the connection.
On the service side, when a Binder request is received, the content
provider’s library code first retrieves low-level credentials (e.g., UID and PID)
about the calling app process as provided by the kernel, then invokes Activity
Manager Service to query whether the requesting process has the required
permission to perform the requested operation. Activity Manager Service has
run-time information about all app processes, and it may also communicate
with Package Manager Service to get static information about different apps’
permissions. If the request passes the permission check, the library code calls
17
the app-specific implementation of the content provider, then returns result.
We summarize the security mechanisms for content providers.
• Permissions are static and coarse-grained. For example, Android’s
built-in Contacts Provider defines two permissions in its manifest, for reading
and writing the entire contact database, respectively.
• Run-time capability passing can be fine-grained, but the decision
whether to pass a capability is up to the app. For example, an app that has
access to Contacts Provider can pass the capability for a specific contact to
another app, but it needs to decide whether this should happen, e.g., whether
this is permitted by the user.
• Access checks are performed by framework library code that runs in
the same process as the content provider app, with reliable request information
provided by the kernel and system services (Figure 2.2).
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Chapter 3
Maxoid: transparently information flow confinement
For mobile apps, the tension between the diversity of providers and the
goals of a seamless mobile experience creates a security problem. Apps from
different developers must work together, but they have no reason to trust each
other. Mobile platforms like Android and iOS provide app-centric security
models where apps are treated as different principals, to protect each app’s
private data, and control each app’s access to shared data by specifying a
variety of permissions (Section 2.3). However, such an intuitive model is not
sufficient to protect confidentiality or integrity for common scenarios where
the user would like two or more apps to cooperate on sensitive data.
For example, email apps must invoke external programs to view at-
tachments, cloud storage apps must invoke external editors, and a comparison
shopping app may need a bar code reader app. In these examples, data ex-
change happens across apps. From the app-centric security perspective, it is
desirable to keep the data private to the original owning app (email, cloud stor-
This chapter is based on previous publication [XW15]“Maxoid: Transparently Confining
Mobile Applications with Custom Views of State”, by Yuanzhong Xu and Emmett Witchel,
in the 10th ACM European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), Bordeaux, France,
April 2015. My contributions to this publication include investigating data leakage problems
in Android, designing the Maxoid state model, implementing the Android-based prototype,
building use cases and evaluating performance overheads.
19
age, shopping); however, the owning app does not have sufficient functionality
to process the data. We call the app that needs to invoke other helper apps
the initiator and the invoked app the delegate, and we say that the delegate
runs on behalf of the initiator. In existing platforms, once the initiator shares
sensitive data with the delegate, it has no control on how the delegate uses
the data. For instance, the delegate may copy the initiator’s sensitive data to
public storage (see Section 3.1.2).
The app-based security model in modern mobile systems allows a new
balance of usability and security for initiator and delegate apps that is not
available to desktop or server systems. Based on the clear distinction of apps’
private and public (shared) state, it is possible to reason about security require-
ments for inter-app cooperation with fairly simple, coarse-grained information
flow mechanisms that require little or no change to existing apps and without
requiring new, complex policies.
We propose Maxoid1, a new security model that provides secrecy and
integrity for cooperating apps. We have built a prototype of Maxoid by modi-
fying Android 4.3.2. Maxoid allows delegates to access initiator private state,
but prevents delegates from leaking these secrets to other apps or transfer-
ring them over the network; delegates may update initiator private state or
public state to return results, but Maxoid allows the initiator to selectively
commit or discard those updates to prevent unwanted modifications by dele-
1The name is a contraction of The Matrix and Android, because Maxoid composes a
custom reality for delegates on Android.
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gates. Conversely, Maxoid also protects delegates by disallowing the initiator
from reading or writing its delegates’ private state.
Maxoid achieves its security goals while minimizing disruption to del-
egates by presenting different views of private and public state to initiators
and delegates. A delegate’s view transparently confines its access to persistent
state like files and data in system content providers (e.g., Media). Delegates
can still access resources to which they have permission (except the loss of
network connection when the confinement begins), without violating Maxoid’s
security properties. Controlling views of state, e.g., by using a union file sys-
tem and a copy-on-write SQL proxy, transparently provides a coarse-grained
mechanism to control information flow.
Maxoid prioritizes backward compatibility and ease of adoption. It is
fully compatible with legacy Android apps when the new Maxoid features are
not used for them. Even when being used to confine delegates, Maxoid can be
completely transparent, i.e., it can support unmodified delegate apps with full
security guarantees. It also provides simple (often optional) APIs for develop-
ers to improve usability. For example, some of a delegate’s data may be cleared
by Maxoid for transparency by default, but it may alternatively use Maxoid
APIs to keep persistent state, like a list of recently accessed files. However,
this state is only accessible when the delegate is run by that same initiator.
Thus, a PDF viewer that runs on behalf of an email client can have previous
email attachments in its recently opened list, but these attachments will not
be visible when the PDF viewer does not run on behalf of the email client.
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Finally, Maxoid has negligible overhead for initiators compared to unmodified
Android; for delegates, it adds a small overhead for most operations though it
slows down certain worst-case microbenchmarks.
3.1 Motivation and overview
This section describes the private and public state in Android, problems
found in case studies, how a näıve information flow control solution suffers from
poor usability, and an overview of Maxoid.
3.1.1 Private and public state in Android
In Android, each app is assigned a dedicated UID, which isolates apps
from each other. An app’s private state includes shared preferences,2 internal
file storage, and private SQLite databases. All of them are stored as private
files of the owning app, with the interface to the key-value store and database
provided by user-level libraries.
Public state includes external file storage (e.g., SD card) and system
content providers (Downloads, Media, User Dictionary, Contacts, etc.). Sys-
tem content providers are implemented as built-in apps, but we treat them as
part of the Android platform in this chapter, because they provide essential
standard APIs for data storage (Section 2.3).
In earlier versions of Android, an app can either have no access to












Figure 3.1: A delegate app (B) can cause leakage of data from an initiator
app (A), by copying it to other apps and the public state, or sending over the
network.
external storage, or have access to all files on it. Starting from Android 4.4, an
app may have partial access to external storage; each app is granted access to
a dedicated directory without explicitly asking for permission. However, apps
with permission for external storage can still access all files on it. Therefore,
we still consider the entire external storage as public state.
3.1.2 Case studies
We analyze the behavior of some popular Android apps that collabora-
tively execute while sharing sensitive data. We categorize these apps into two
types: 1) data processing apps, which can be typically used as delegates, and
2) apps that need help from data processing apps, which can be used as initia-
tors. One theme that emerges is that Android’s access control model provides
no information flow control on sensitive data, which limits how effectively it
can enforce security protections. Figure 3.1 is an high-level illustration of how
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Image saved to SD card.
Thumbnail on SD card.





Photo saved to SD card.
Entry in Media Provider.
edit a photo Entry in Media Provider.
Media 10 VPlayer play a video
DB: playback
history.
Thumbnail on SD card.
Table 3.1: State left after apps process their target data. In the private state
column, XML indicates state saved in the shared preference key-value store;
DB indicates state saved in an SQLite database; ADF indicates state saved in
files with app-defined formats.
Data processing apps. We manually study 77 popular Android apps for
processing different types of data, such as documents, media files, and QR
codes. These apps are selected based on popularity and relevance from Google
Play. We find that, after processing data, these apps leave traces of that
data that can be accessed by other apps. Table 3.1 summarizes how different
classes of apps leak state. Currently, there is no careful control of state at the
application level, so Maxoid aims to provide it at the system level.
Apps that need help of others. We analyze four Android apps that need
the help of other apps.
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I. Dropbox. Dropbox hosts the user’s files, but has very limited support
for processing files. When the Dropbox app fetches a file from its server, it
saves the file to a directory in public external storage to allow other apps
to open it. Therefore, the Dropbox client does not provide privacy on its
files. Whenever another app changes a file, Dropbox automatically syncs this
change to its server, even if this change is unintended. This behavior provides
no integrity for Dropbox’s files.
II. Google Drive. Google Drive is similar to Dropbox, but 1) it caches
downloaded files in its private internal storage; 2) it can save encrypted files
to external storage for offline access, which will be decrypted and cached in in-
ternal storage when the user opens them. Google Drive makes internal cached
files world-readable to allow other apps to open, but the path names include
random strings and other apps cannot list entries in the parent directory. Thus
invoked apps only know how to access specific files that Google Drive discloses
to them via invocations. However, they can leak information about the files
that have been disclosed to them. (see Table 3.1).
III. Email. Emails often contain attachments. By default, Android’s
built-in Email app saves an attachment file in its private internal storage for
security. The user can explicitly save an attachment to external storage and its
metadata to the Downloads provider. To allow another app to open the private
internal file, Email uses Android’s per-URI permissions: it defines a content
provider that maps a content URI to an attachment file, then invokes the
other app with the corresponding URI, and sets the flag FLAG_GRANT_READ_-
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URI_PERMISSION. Now the invoked app can open this URI to get a Parcel-
FileDescriptor. The actual file is still opened by Email’s process, but the
file descriptor is passed to the invoked app. This mechanism only grants the
invoked app one-time permission on the single file. However, the invoked app
can still copy this file to its private state or public state (Table 3.1).
IV. Browsers. Chrome and Android’s built-in Browser app support
incognito mode to avoid leaving traces about the user’s browsing history on
the device. However, neither browser supports incognito download. In an
incognito tab, a user-downloaded file will be saved to external storage and
added to the Downloads provider, which maintains index and metadata for
downloaded files. Even if the browsers were modified to store the files in private
internal storage, and adopt a per-URI permission approach to allow other apps
to open them, the same problems would still exist as with Email, since the
browsers cannot erase data left by other apps. Even a browser with perfect
incognito mode would not address the safety of input data. For example, if
the user reads a URL from a QR code scanner app and opens it in a browser,
the browser’s incognito mode cannot erase the data’s history in the scanning
app.
In summary, the fundamental problem with app collaboration in An-
droid is a lack of an information flow security mechanism that would allow
another app to receive sensitive data, but then limit the receiving app’s ability
to communicate once it has read that data.
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3.1.3 Information flow tracking and challenges
Additional information flow control mechanisms are needed to secure
the use cases in Section 3.1.2. A potential solution is to perform taint tracking
on apps’ private data. The system allows one app to send its private data to
another app, but the data is labeled as tainted. Then the receiver is confined
such that any of its data depending on the received data will also be tainted,
and disallowed from being written to public storage or the network. This
approach is in line with previous decentralized information flow control (DIFC)
systems.
Difficulty in programmability. Typical DIFC systems are not designed
to be backward compatible with legacy applications. Applications need to
be re-written to comply with the security rules in those systems. Under-
standing subtle data flows makes it difficult to adapt complex applications to
fine-grained information flow tracking [EKV+05].
However, our goal is to support legacy applications. Näıvely applying
previous approaches would cause serious usability issues.
Uncontrolled taint propagation. Legacy apps often do not distinguish
public input and private input from other apps. For example, when Adobe
Reader opens a PDF file, it does not take extra care of controlling data prop-
agation if the file is a private attachment from Email; in reality, it creates an
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entry in the list of recent files, and makes a copy of the attachment and stores
it on the public SD card (Table 3.1).
To secure this use case, a taint tracking system would need to label
the attachment as tainted, and control the propagation of data depending on
it. It may disallow Adobe Reader from writing tainted data (such as a copy
of the file) to the SD card or the network. However, such restrictions would
probably break the normal operation of Adobe Reader, because it would get
unexpected permission errors.
An alternative approach is to still allow Adobe Reader to write tainted
data to the SD card, but to keep the taint on the written data. Writing tainted
data to the network is still disallowed, because the platform cannot track taint
propagation outside the device. This approach may not directly break Adobe
Reader, but it suffers from the problem of uncontrolled taint propagation. The
SD card is a public resource, which means if other apps read tainted data on
it, they would be tainted as well. Different apps would collectively propagate
taint throughout the device, making many apps unable to write to network.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the dilemma when using such näıve information
flow tracking approaches.
Granularity of taint tracking. In general, a more fine-grained taint-tracking
mechanism tends to suffer less from usability problems caused by false posi-
tives. However, fine-grained mechanisms also tend to have more complexity




















Figure 3.2: Dilemma of näıvely applying information flow tracking approaches.
The approach shown on the left causes significant disruptions to the delegate
by disabling access to public state and communication with other apps; the
other approach shown on the right results in uncontrolled taint propagation
that disables many apps from accessing the network.
ing system with moderate overhead on Android, but it does not track implicit
data leakage via control flows.
3.1.4 Overview of Maxoid
To solve the above usability problems, Maxoid controls the propaga-
tion of tainted data by maintaining extra copies of data when necessary, and
presenting transparent views of these data for confined apps to keep backward
compatibility.
This technique allows Maxoid to adopt a fairly coarse-grained, conser-
vative taint tracking mechanism while remaining usable. In Maxoid, once an
app receives private data from another app, all of its outputs are considered
tainted and thus protected by creating extra copies. The coarse-grained ap-
proach avoids much of the potential complexity and performance penalty in
taint-tracking systems.
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Definitions. Maxoid differentiates the execution context of an app instance
running on behalf of another. In Maxoid, an app can run on behalf of itself,
in which case it executes identically to how it would in Android. But if an
app executes on behalf of another app, there are system facilities to manage
information propagation.
App B’s instance running on behalf of app A is denoted as BA, where
A is called the initiator app of BA, and BA is called a delegate of A.
Like in Android, an app can declassify its private data by writing it
to public state, or sending it via IPC to other apps. Maxoid does not prevent
A from mistakenly declassifying its own private state; it prevents BA from
leaking A’s sensitive data via public writes or IPC.
Maxoid confines BA so it can safely access A’s private data. To make
the confinement transparent to BA, Maxoid creates custom views of private
and public state for BA. In these views, BA can still access a resource as
long as B normally has the permission (see Section 3.2.1).
Maxoid confinement is invocation-transitive. When BA invokes an-
other app, the invoked instance is forced to be a delegate of A, e.g., CA (see
Section 3.2.4).
Augmented delegate access right. Input to BA is even more permissive
than B’s normal execution – BA can also read A’s private state. BA can still
observe other apps’ updates to public resources after BA starts. Moreover, BA
can still write to all allowed resources, and it will read its own writes, but these
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writes are transparently confined by Maxoid. BA does not need to know it is
executing on behalf of A, which allows Maxoid to support unmodified apps.
Network. In keeping with Maxoid’s coarse-grained design philosophy, dele-
gates are prevented from accessing the network, because Maxoid cannot control
data flow in the network. Since network disruption is common in the mobile
environment, cutting off network access is typically tolerated by apps. The del-
egate still has access to any data fetched from the network prior to its starting
to run on behalf of an initiator. When the delegate is next run on behalf of
itself (as an initiator), its access to the network is restored. Lack of network
access for delegates means that Maxoid does not support scenarios where BA
needs to send A’s private data to a server for processing (although A still has
the option to invoke B to do that insecurely as in Android). We could avoid
cutting off network access by extending Maxoid into apps’ backend services, if
they were all hosted on a trusted cloud, and preventing apps from accessing
network resources other than the trusted cloud, like in πBox [LWG+13].
IPC. Maxoid tracks and controls inter-app communication to enforce its se-
curity properties. It also allows initiators to specify their security requirements
using Android intents—Android’s inter-app invocation mechanism.
3.1.5 Threat model
Maxoid protects initiators from arbitrary malicious delegates. The del-
egate apps can be written in Java and run in the Dalvik VM, or written in
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C and compiled as native binaries. This is because Maxoid’s security enforce-
ment is implemented in trusted system services and the kernel. Delegates can
directly access private data of their initiators, but Maxoid controls their output
to avoid data leakage and unexpected modifications.
Maxoid also protects delegates from malicious initiators. Being an ini-
tiator does not mean the app is privileged; like in Android, it is still prevented
from reading or writing private data of other apps, including its delegates.
Maxoid does not prevent an app from mishandling its own private data.
It does not stop an initiator from mistakenly leaking its own private data, or
mistakenly handling the interactions with their delegates which might com-
promise data integrity.
Maxoid assumes the operating system kernel and trusted system ser-
vices are not compromised. Side channel attacks are out of our scope.
3.2 State model and Maxoid architecture
Maxoid presents different transparent views of private and public states
to initiators and delegates. Some data in these views may have different ver-
sions; maintaining multiple versions of data is a key technique in Maxoid that
resolves the problem of taint propagation. We introduce several notations for
views of state.
• Priv(x): the view of private state for app instance x.
• Pub(x): the view of public state that Maxoid presents to x. Note that
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this includes resources that x may not have permission.3
• Pub(all): the data shared by all apps. If x is an initiator, Pub(x) =
Pub(all).
Whether an app runs as a delegate or an initiator, it can access everything in
its view of private state, and everything in its view of public state for which
it has the corresponding Android permissions (decided at install time).
The goal of Maxoid is to improve security for A by confining BA in
such a way as to minimize disruption and code changes to Android, A, and B.
Maxoid achieves the following security goals and usability goals.
S1. Secrecy of the initiator. Only A and delegates of A can access A’s
private state. When B no longer runs on behalf of A, it cannot observe data
depending on A’s private state, unless A declassifies it, e.g., by writing it to
public state, or sending it via IPC to other apps.
S2. Integrity of the initiator. When BA updates A’s private or public
state, A has the ability to revert to the previous version. In fact, Maxoid
requires A or the user to commit BA’s update to make it the default version
for A and other apps not executing on behalf of A; otherwise, the update is
only visible to A and A’s delegates.
3 x can actually access Pub(x) ∩ Perms(x), where Perms(x) is the set of Android
permissions that x has for public resources. For simplicity, we do not explicitly mention
Perms(x) in this section.
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S3. Secrecy of the delegate. A cannot learn the private state of BA unless
BA declassifies it.
S4. Integrity of the delegate. First, A cannot write to BA’s private state;
second, when B no longer runs on behalf of any other app, Maxoid restores
the private state as it was right before it was last started as a delegate. Having
run on behalf of other apps does not modify B’s private state.
In addition to the security guarantees, the design of Maxoid is guided
by a principle that we call minimum isolation: whenever a data flow is safe,
it should be allowed in order to minimize disruption. In addition to mini-
mum isolation, Maxoid strives to be backward compatible. Minimum isolation
guides U1and U2 , while backward compatibility guides U3 .
U1. Initial state availability. WhenBA is started, Pub(BA) and Priv(BA)
contain all data available in Pub(all) and Priv(B) up to that point. Maxoid
does not create a blank initial environment for delegates, where a delegate
would lose the user’s normal preference settings and useful data collected pre-
viously.
U2. Update visibility. First, an initiator’s update to public state can be
observed by all app instances, including delegates of any initiator. Second, a
delegate’s update to public state (e.g., Pub(BA)) should be observed by its
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Figure 3.3: Overview of Maxoid confinement. Hatching in a state box indicates
taints: Priv(A) and Priv(B) are the sources of taints, V ol(A) is tainted by
Priv(A), and Priv(BA) is tainted by both Priv(A) and Priv(B).
CA).
U3. Transparency to delegates. Maxoid should support unmodified del-
egates by maintaining the same API to access state as Android. BA is al-
ways allowed to read/write Priv(BA); BA is allowed to read/write a resource
in Pub(BA) as long as B has the permission to read/write this resource in
Pub(all).
3.2.1 Confining delegates by custom views
Figure 3.3 illustrates how Maxoid confines a delegate. Solid arrows
represent possible read/write by an app instance to a state. We describe the
confinement and show how it achieves the security and usability goals.
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Views. For initiators, the views of private and public state are identical to
those in Android.
For a delegate BA, Priv(BA) is initialized as a snapshot of Priv(B)
(U1 ), and any update by BA is made copy-on-write. As a result, BA’s private
writes are confined in Priv(BA) and can not affect Priv(B) (S4 ).
Initially Pub(BA) consists of Pub(all) (U1 ) and Priv(A). By includ-
ing Priv(A) in BA’s view of public state, Maxoid naturally grants BA the
permission to access Priv(A). However, all writes by BA to Pub(BA) are redi-
rected to the volatile state of A, or V ol(A), such that BA cannot directly
overwrite Pub(all) or Priv(A) (S2 ).
All delegates of A share the same V ol(A), and the same view of public
state. We use Pub(xA) to denote the view for all delegates of A, where x is not a
specific app. V ol(A) is defined as the set of data written by all of A’s delegates
to Pub(xA). Pub(xA) is a transparent, merged view of Pub(all)∪Priv(A) and
V ol(A) (see Section 3.2.3).
Information flows. A directed path of solid arrows in Figure 3.3 represents
an information flow. Maxoid doesn’t use fine-grained taint tracking [EGC+10],
but enforces conservative rules to guarantee security.
1. Priv(A)→ BA → V ol(A). This indicates that V ol(A) may depend
on Priv(A), i.e., V ol(A) is tainted by Priv(A). Thus V ol(A) is only visible
to A and delegates of A (S1 ).
36
2. Priv(A) → BA → Priv(BA). Priv(BA) is thus tainted by both
Priv(A) and Priv(B) (Priv(BA) is initially forked from Priv(B)). Therefore,
BA is the only app instance that can access Priv(BA) (S1 , S3 ).
3. Priv(BA)→ BA → V ol(A), but V ol(A) is not tainted by Priv(B),
because V ol(A) is part of Pub(BA) and BA already declassifies the writes to
V ol(A), i.e., removes the Priv(B) taint; however, it has no power to remove
the Priv(A) taint on V ol(A). Maxoid, like Android, considers every write by
x to Pub(x) a declassification.
4. V ol(A) ↔ A, A can observe and control its delegates’ updates to
Pub(xA) (U2 ).
5. A cannot read or write Priv(BA) (S3 , S4 ).
Transparency (U3). The security properties (S1 - S4 ) are automatically
enforced by Maxoid presenting BA custom views of state. BA can still read/-
write data in Priv(BA) and Pub(BA), without extra app logic to obey security
rules.
3.2.2 Evolving views of private state
History of a delegate’s private state. When BA starts, Priv(BA) is
forked from Priv(B), as required by initial state availability (U1 ). When B
no longer runs on behalf of A, its private state is resumed to the version that
was forked. If B makes updates to Priv(B), then Priv(BA) and Priv(B) will
diverge. The next time BA runs, Maxoid cannot merge them.
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In that case, if B is not aware of Maxoid, to maintain transparency,
we could either 1) discard the old Priv(BA), and fork from Priv(B) if it
diverges from the old Priv(BA); or 2) keep using the old Priv(BA). Either
way, some updates are invisible to BA, although it is safe to let BA see them.
We choose the first option, for several reasons. First, the user can update
his/her preferences while normally using B, and those updates will be in effect
when he/she uses B as a delegate of any other app; second, BA does not have
network access but B could fetch data from the Internet, thus Priv(B) may
contain resources that BA cannot obtain. Note that Priv(BA) will not be
discarded when B is consecutively invoked as a delegate for any initiator.
Persistent private state. Nevertheless, if the delegate app is aware of Max-
oid, it can use a Maxoid API to improve its usability. Maxoid splits a delegate’s
private state into two parts: 1) the normal private state as in Android,
nPriv(BA), and 2) the persistent private state, pPriv(BA).
nPriv(BA) will be discarded if it diverges from Priv(B), and will be
reforked from it. pPriv(BA) will not be discarded (unless A explicitly requests
so), and BA can use it to store data that is persistent across invocations even
if B updates Priv(B) between invocations of BA. For different initiators, del-
egates have different isolated views of persistent private state, e.g., pPriv(BA)
and pPriv(BC) are isolated. Figure 3.4 demonstrates how pPriv and nPriv
evolve over time.































Figure 3.4: Normal and persistent private states evolving over time. A solid
box is an app instance running for a period. An ellipse shows the value (version
number) of a state before or after an invocation.
this API is optional, and exists only for improving usability. For instance, if a
document viewer runs normally, it can store entries of recent files in a database
that belongs to its normal private state. If it runs on behalf of another app, it
can store the entries in a database that belongs to its persistent private state;
other unimportant updates like cache files can still be stored in the normal
private state. When it is started as a delegate, it can generate a list of recent
files merged from both databases.
3.2.3 Public state and volatile state
In Android, a public resource can be located via a file name or a URI
(for content providers), which we refer to as a name. The entire public state
can be viewed as a set of name-value pairs.
Maxoid needs to create extra volatile copies of data when delegates
write to their views of public state, to prevent Pub(all) from being tainted.
Maxoid does not take a full snapshot of the entire Pub(all) when a delegate
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starts. Instead, it adopts a unilateral per-name copy-on-write mechanism.
If none of A’s delegates has updated a public resource, the same copy
of this resource is shared in both Pub(xA) and Pub(all); BA can see updates
to this resource by initiators. Once a delegate of A updates a public resource,
Maxoid creates a volatile copy of this resource for all delegates of A. From
this point on, BA only sees the volatile copy and cannot observe the updates
from non-delegates, until A removes this volatile copy; however, this does not
affect other resources.
This copy-on-write mechanism is unilateral, because it only happens
for writes from delegates. With this mechanism, delegates of A may observe
some resources updated themselves, but some other resources updated by ini-
tiators. If the two sets of resources have dependencies, consistency issues might
occur. However, inconsistencies in public resources are common in Android
because they are rarely protected by system-wide locks. At minimum, Maxoid
guarantees that all of A’s delegates can read their writes.
We do not use full snapshots of Pub(all), for two reasons. First, cre-
ating a full snapshot for a delegate would make it unable to observe later
updates from initiators to any resource in Pub(all), which is a violation of
update visibility (U2 ). Second, full snapshots are expensive, because they re-
quire making copies whenever any initiator writes to the public state. Instead,
Maxoid minimizes performance overhead for the normal initiator mode.
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Naming of resources in different views. When a delegate BA updates a
resource in public state, Maxoid forks the resource, keeping both the original
and the updated versions of the resource.
• All delegates of A see only the updated version with the original name,
as part of Pub(xA). This guarantees delegates that they will read their
writes.
• A sees both versions. The original version keeps the original name, as
part of Pub(all). The updated version is given a different name, as part
of V ol(A).
Commit and clean-up. Data in the volatile state can be retrieved by the
initiator with names in a special pattern, i.e., a “tmp” in the path name or
the URI. Often, the initiator A (e.g., Dropbox) only wants BA (an editor) to
change one or a few files, but BA may also generate side effects like cached
copies and metadata saved to databases. The desired and undesired changes
to public state by BA all belong to V ol(A). A can selectively commit the
desired change by copying it from V ol(A) to a non-volatile place. After that,
A can discard the entire V ol(A) conveniently because of the fixed naming
pattern, to clean up undesired changes. The commit operation can be done
by the user manually, or by adding functionality to the initiator for a better
user experience.
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3.2.4 IPC and initiator policy specification
Android’s inter-process communication is based on the native Binder
IPC. However, the direct use of it is typically for intra-app, and app-to-system-
service communications. Background inter-app communication using content
providers is also based on Binder.
In Maxoid, direct Binder IPC for a delegate is restricted to its initiator,
other delegates of the same initiator, and trusted system processes.
Intent. Inter-app invocation is done with a higher-level API, intent. An
app uses an intent to invoke another app: the intent describes an invocation
and is passed to Activity Manager Service (via Binder IPC), which finds the
suitable target app component and routes the intent to it. The intent itself
may contain the sender’s sensitive data, or a URI/path name to some sensitive
data.
Invocation-transitivity. When BA invokes app C, the invoked instance is
forced to be A’s delegate, i.e., CA. Therefore, BA cannot leak data in Priv(A)
via IPC; it can only invoke A or delegates of A (S1 ). Also, since Maxoid
does not stop the invocation, BA is not disrupted (U3 ). Similarly, broadcast
intents from BA are only delivered to A and delegates of A.
If initiator C invokes app B, the invoked instance can only be either B
on behalf of itself or BC ; C cannot invoke BA to steal Priv(A) from the result
of the invocation (S1 ).
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Specifying invocation type. When initiator A invokes another app, it can
specify whether the invoked app will be started normally (on behalf of itself)
or as a delegate of A. If an invocation contains or points to A’s data that A
thinks needs protection, it should invoke the target app as a delegate. Maxoid
has two ways for an initiator to specify this intention, and the details will be
discussed in Section 3.5.1.
Maxoid also allows the user to start a delegate BA without A’s explicit
invocation if this is the user’s intention. The user can specify this intention
with the user interface of the system’s Launcher (Section 3.5.3).
Maxoid does not support nested delegation. If BA specifies to in-
voke C as B’s delegate, that invocation will fail, because BA can only invoke
delegates of A.
3.2.5 Maxoid system architecture
The system architecture of Maxoid is shown in Figure 3.5. It has new
components in Android’s Activity Manager Service and kernel to track the
context of apps (e.g., what initiators they run on behalf of) and intent IPC be-
tween them, and choose the correct context for a new invocation (Section 3.2.4,
Section 3.5.2). Other components implement Maxoid view switching for file
system (Section 3.3) and system content providers (Section 3.4). Zygote is the
parent process in Android that forks all app processes, which preloads common
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Figure 3.5: Maxoid system architecture. Gray boxes are new components or
modifications to Android.
3.3 File system
This section explains how Maxoid manages different views of the file
system.
3.3.1 Files in Maxoid views
An app can access private and public files in the same way as it does
in Android. It uses regular path names, and Maxoid achieves security trans-
parently by presenting it the correct view of files. In addition, an initiator A’s
volatile state V ol(A) is a new concept in Maxoid, and files in it can be located
by A in a tmp directory under the mount point.
Figure 3.6 illustrates a scenario involving A, BA and another app X,
which all read/write some files. Each of them has its own view of these files.
Files in Pub(all) are visible to all three app instances, and they have the same
view of these files, until BA’s write causes unilateral copy-on-write. BA can
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Figure 3.6: Views of files for A, BA and X. The figure shows a scenario where
A wants BA to edit a file b, but BA also has side changes on file c.
access files in Priv(A), but any write operation also causes copy-on-write.
After BA writes, Maxoid presents it the updated version with the original
path name to let it read its write, while A sees the updated version in the tmp
directory which is part of V ol(A). X cannot learn any update made by BA,
or any private file of A.
3.3.2 Implementing Maxoid views with Aufs
Aufs4 is a union file system that can provide a merged view of multiple
branches (directories) in a single mount point. If multiple branches contain the
same path name, Aufs presents the file in the branch with highest priority. If
only that branch is writable, the process’ writes are sandboxed in it; modifying
a file which does not exist in the writable branch will result in copying that
4http://aufs.sourceforge.net/
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file to the writable branch. Therefore, we can use Aufs to implement per-file
copy-on-write.
Maxoid uses the Linux mount namespace to present different views to
different apps. When the app process is created, Maxoid first calls unshare()
in Zygote to create the process’ private mount namespace. Maxoid adds an
Aufs branch manager (Figure 3.5) in Zygote, which selects and mounts the
relevant branches for a new app process.
Internal private directory. Maxoid uses a file system-based solution for
various types of private state, since shared preferences and private databases
are represented as private files. Android assigns each app a private data di-
rectory in internal storage, under /data/data/. We retain this interface as the
private state of an initiator (e.g., Priv(A)) or the normal private state of a
delegate (e.g., nPriv(BA)).
When BA starts, the branch manager mounts Aufs at the location of
B’s private directory as nPriv(BA), with two branches. One branch is read-
only, which is the normal private data directory that the app uses when not
running as a delegate; the other branch is writable, which is a directory only
accessible to this delegate. The writable private branch has higher priority
and is initially empty, thus all writes are redirected to it. The directory of
the writable branch is located in a path that only root can directly access; the
delegate can only use it via the Aufs mount point.
Aufs is not used for initiators’ private directories. B can directly write
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Priv(B). However, Priv(B) is a branch of Priv(BA), and updates to Priv(B)
are visible to BA; if B and BA run simultaneously, BA would likely observe
inconsistencies in Priv(BA). To avoid inconsistency without creating full snap-
shot of Priv(B) or adding overhead to B, a running instance of B will be killed
when BA is invoked.
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, a delegate may also have persistent private
state (pPriv). It is represented as another directory in internal storage under
/data/data/ppriv. BA and BC use the same path name for persistent private
state, but Maxoid presents them different views of this directory by mounting
independent Aufs branches at this location. For each delegate, a single writable
branch is used.
External storage. Files in external storage, such as an SD card, are world-
accessible in Android. External storage is mounted at a public directory, such
as /storage/sdcard. The mount point varies in different devices, and we use
EXTDIR to denote it.
Naming volatile files. Volatile files caused by delegates’ writes to
external storage are located in the tmp subdirectory under EXTDIR. Specifically,
if a delegate writes to a file EXTDIR/〈path〉, the corresponding volatile copy
can be located by the initiator via path name EXTDIR/tmp/〈path〉. Different
initiators have different views of EXTDIR/tmp.
Allow private files on external storage for backward compatibility. Cur-
rently, Android apps, e.g., Dropbox, often store their files on public external
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EXTDIR/tmp A/tmp (rw) N/A
Table 3.2: Aufs mount points for A and BA. A and B each specify EXTDIR/A
and EXTDIR/B as a private directory on external storage storage. “rw” means a
read-write branch, and other branches are read-only.
storage to allow other apps to open them, giving up protection. With Maxoid,
Dropbox could store those files in private state and still allow delegates to open
them safely. To support such apps without changing their source code, and to
avoid using too much space on internal storage (which has limited capacity in
many devices), we allow an app A to specify a list of private directories on
external storage as part of Priv(A).
However, we cannot make a directory private to A by simply disallowing
other apps access to it, because apps with access to external storage expect to
have access to all files on it. Instead, A and other apps have different views
of this directory. Other apps can still use it as a public directory, but only A
and its delegates can see A’s private files in it.
The Aufs branch manager divides the external storage into different
branches (subdirectories): a public branch for all apps, and a private branch
for each initiator or delegate. Then it mounts Aufs to EXTDIR, using relevant
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branches. Table 3.2 shows the mount points for A and BA. Suppose A and B
each specify EXTDIR/data/A and EXTDIR/data/B as a private directory, then
• Files in Pub(all) are located in pub branch.
• EXTDIR/data/A for A is backed by its private branch A/data/A.
• Except EXTDIR/data/A and EXTDIR/tmp, A accesses files in other places
on pub branch.
• BA can read A’s private files in EXTDIR/data/A, because A/data/A is a
read-only branch for it.
• BA’s writes to EXTDIR/data/B are redirected to branch B-A/data/B, which
is not visible to A or B.
• BA’s writes to other places are redirected to branch A/tmp, which are
only visible to A (as V ol(A)) and delegates of A (as Pub(xA)). This
allows A to get the results of BA’s edits, without letting BA directly
overwrite the original version.
Internal private files exposed to delegates. Maxoid allows a delegate
to access its initiator’s private data directory in internal storage. We adopt a
similar approach as for external storage. To the delegate, the internal directory
is part of its view of public state; if it makes modifications, its initiator will
see both the original and modified versions, where the modified versions are
part of the initiator’s volatile state.
Maxoid mounts Aufs for the delegate, with the initiator’s private di-
rectory as a read-only branch, and a tmp directory as a writable branch. We
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modify Aufs to always allow read access, to allow the delegate to read the
read-only branch (the delegate and its initiator have different UIDs); this is
safe because Maxoid only mounts Aufs when read is allowed, and an app’s
process can no longer mount Aufs after Zygote drops root privilege. Similarly,
the tmp directory is made accessible to the initiator as an Aufs mount.
3.4 System content providers
We describe the views of data in system content providers that Maxoid
presents to apps.
3.4.1 System content providers in Maxoid
System content providers, like Downloads, Media, Contacts and Cal-
ender, are built-in packages that provide standard platform-level APIs. They
typically use SQLite databases as backends. We built a copy-on-write proxy
layer (Section 3.4.2) on top of SQLite, and modify these providers to use the
proxy so that they can switch views for different app instances.
User Dictionary is a simple system content provider that maps URIs to
records in the user dictionary database, the columns of which include ID, Word,
Frequency, etc. A record with ID=n can be retrieved via URI content://-
user_dictionary/words/n. URI content://user_dictionary/words represents
all records in the database.
The ID column is the primary key in the database. This type of URI-to-
ID mapping is generic for many system content providers, including Downloads
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and Media. Essentially, a URI is mapped to a database row (or a group of
rows). Our proxy layer implements per-row, per-initiator unilateral copy-on-
write, and thus can naturally support these system content providers with
minimal code change.
In Maxoid, the results of write operations (insert or update) by a del-
egate BA are stored as volatile records, as part of V ol(A). BA cannot
overwrite any public records. Similarly, when BA deletes a URI, the public
record is not affected; instead, Maxoid emulates a deletion for BA by creating
a “whiteout” volatile record (Section 3.4.2). For each ID, there is at most one
volatile record in V ol(A). If the volatile record for ID=n doesn’t exist, BA
sees the public record (if it exists) in the result of a query. After the volatile
record is created by a delegate’s insert or update, any operation from BA on
ID=n will happen on the volatile record.
BA’s view of the content provider is transparent. BA always uses nor-
mal URIs. It only sees a single version for each ID and can read its own writes.
On the other hand, if A uses a normal URI, the content provider will oper-
ate on the public records; to access volatile copies, it can use volatile URIs,
which has a tmp component, e.g.,
• content://user_dictionary/tmp/words/〈n〉
• content://user_dictionary/tmp/words/

















t1,t2: tables                 Δt1(A),Δt2(A): delta tables for A               v1: user-defined view
t1(A),t2(A),v1(A): COW views of t1,t2,v1 for A's delegates
Figure 3.7: COW proxy interacts with the content provider and SQLite. Note
that v1 is an SQL view defined by the content provider.
3.4.2 SQLite copy-on-write proxy layer
We built a copy-on-write (COW) proxy layer on top of SQLite API, to
minimize modifications to content providers.
Figure 3.7 shows how the proxy layer interacts with the content provider
and SQLite. It provides the same APIs as SQLite to content providers for
normal database operations, and some additional APIs for administrative op-
erations. It achieves unilateral per-name copy-on-write (Section 3.2.3), where
a name corresponds to a database row.
We call each table defined by the content provider a primary table.
Primary tables only store data that belongs to Pub(all). For each primary
table, the proxy maintains per-initiator delta tables, to store volatile state
of different initiators. We say a COW view for A’s delegates is the view of
a specific primary table in Pub(xA). A COW view is implemented as a SQL
view – a virtual table based on a query result in SQL – defined on the primary











View for A's delegates tab1_view_A – pub(xA)




A's delta table  tab1_delta_A   – Vol(A)
CREATE VIEW tab1_view_A AS
SELECT _id,data FROM tab1 WHERE
 _id not in (SELECT _id FROM tab1_delta_A)
UNION ALL
SELECT _id,data FROM tab1_delta_A WHERE
     _whiteout=0
CREATE TRIGGER tab1_A_update
  INSTEAD OF UPDATE ON tab1_view_A
BEGIN
  INSERT OR REPLACE INTO tab1_delta_A
   (_id,data) VALUES(NEW._id, NEW.data);
END;
CREATE TRIGGER tab1_A_delete
  INSTEAD OF DELETE ON tab1_view_A
BEGIN
  INSERT OR REPLACE INTO tab1_delta_A
    (_id,data,_whiteout)
    VALUES(OLD._id, OLD.data, 1);
END;
Figure 3.8: Delta table and the view for delegates maintained by the SQLite
proxy layer.
Per-initiator delta tables and COW views. A delta table has all columns
in the primary table, plus an additional boolean column called _whiteout (Fig-
ure 3.8). When the content provider queries for BA, the result will be generated
from both the primary table and A’s delta table. If a row Rd in the delta ta-
ble has the same primary key as a row Rp in the primary table, Rp will not
appear in the result. If Rd has _whiteout=0 and satisfies the WHERE conditions
in the query, it will be included in the result. _whiteout is thus an indicator
of whether the record has been deleted for delegates; if Rd has _whiteout=1,
the result will include neither Rd nor Rp.
The proxy implements the table’s COW view for an initiator’s dele-
gates, based on a SQL view. The COW view is transparent, which means it
can be used in the same way as a regular table, and can be contained in the
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definition of other SQL views. It is defined as the compound SELECT state-
ment using UNION ALL in Figure 3.8. Its definition satisfies the constraints for
SQLite’s subquery flattening optimization5, which makes queries on it efficient
because the query planner moves the WHERE clause (if any) on this view into
the two inner subqueries.
However, SQLite views are read-only. To support insert, the proxy
places BA’s inserts into the delta table. Typically, the primary key is generated
by incrementing the current maximum primary key in the table. The primary
table’s primary key starts from 1. To avoid naming collision, the delta table’s
primary key starts at a large number N for newly inserted rows.
To support update and delete, we define INSTEAD OF triggers on the
per-initiator COW views (Figure 3.8). These triggers implement per-row copy-
on-write, which confines modifications in the delta table.
Delta tables and COW views are created on demand. A’s delta table
and COW view are created when the first volatile record is created, by either
A itself or its delegates.
User-defined SQL views. The user of SQLite, i.e., content providers in thie
case, may define their own SQL views over base tables. The proxy maintains
delta tables only for base tables, not for SQLite views which are stateless. But
to support user-defined SQL views, the proxy maintains per-initiator COW
5http://www.sqlite.org/optoverview.html
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views for each of them, which are created on demand, and defined identically
to the original user-defined SQL views, except that the base tables in the
definition are replaced with their corresponding COW views. Moreover, one
user-defined SQL view may use another user-defined SQL view as one of its
“base tables”; accordingly, the proxy maintains a hierarchy of COW views
(Figure 3.7), and the user-defined view’s COW view can only be created after
the COW views of its base tables are created.
Maxoid view selection. The COW proxy uses a Maxoid API to get the
information about the calling process, which tells whether the caller is a del-
egate and what its initiator is. It then selects the correct Maxoid view. If
the caller is not a delegate, the operation will only involve primary tables as
normal; otherwise, the proxy selects the correct delta tables or COW views,
and creates them if they do not exist.
Additionally, the proxy allows the content provider to select what Max-
oid view it would like to use. This enables the content provider to do admin-
istrative operations and implement new URIs for volatile state. The proxy
defines an administrative view, which contains data in the primary table and
all delta tables, with an additional column that indicates what state a row
belongs to.
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3.4.3 Modifications to content providers
So far, we have ported three system content providers using the COW
proxy: User Dictionary, Downloads, and Media.
User Dictionary. User Dictionary is purely a passive storage service, which
means it only queries/updates data when a client explicitly requests so. In
this case, porting is trivial, though we add new URIs for volatile state.
Downloads. Although a delegate is not supposed to access the network,
we modify Downloads to allow an initiator to create volatile downloads, e.g.,
for incognito mode. Downloads has not only storage, but also background
threads for downloading files and mechanisms to generate notifications. They
actively query and update data. Thus it needs to use the administrative view
to get all public and volatile records, and track what state a record belongs to.
Downloads has two tables, downloads and request_headers. For a delegate’s
operation, the proxy selects the corresponding views for both tables. For
operations by Downloads itself, Downloads selects the correct view based on
the information it tracks. Downloads stores the path names of downloaded files
in its database, and needs to access those files. Maxoid makes all volatile tmp
directories visible to Downloads, but the path names of the files are different
from those stored in the database (which are transparent to clients). We wrote
a wrapper of Java’s File class to automate locating files.
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Media. Media defines multiple SQL tables and views. For example, it stores
data for different types of media files in a single base table called files; images,
audio_meta and video are views defined as selections over files. audio is a
view defined on three tables/views, including audio_meta. We use the COW
proxy to manage the hierarchy of COW views. Like Downloads, Media also
has extra services beyond data storage, e.g., creating thumbnails. Similarly,
modified Media keeps track of what state a record/request belongs to.
3.5 API and implementation
Our Maxoid prototype is based on Android 4.3.2.
3.5.1 API summary
Maxoid introduces a few new (sometimes optional) changes for initia-
tors. For delegates, although Maxoid is mostly transparent, it defines new
optional APIs for better usability.
APIs for initiators.
1. An app can specify a list of private directories in external storage
(Section 3.3.2) via an XML file called the Maxoid manifest.
2. When the initiator invokes another app, it can specify whether the
invoked app will be a delegate of it in two ways:
1) A new flag in Intent. When this flag is set, the invoked app will
be a delegate. App developers can modify their code to use this flag when
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Maxoid is available.
2) Intent filters for invokers. Maxoid allows an app to specify a
whitelist or blacklist of intent filters in its Maxoid manifest. When the initia-
tor sends an intent, Maxoid checks it against the filters to decide whether the
invoked app should be a delegate. Code change is not needed for initiators.
Additionally, we also modify the system’s launcher, to allow BA to
start withoutA’s explicit invocation if this is the user’s intention (Section 3.5.3).
3. An initiator can manage its volatile state (Section 3.3 and Sec-
tion 3.4).
4. When an initiator creates a new record in a system content provider,
Maxoid allows it to specify whether this record is volatile or not. By default,
the new record will be public; if it asserts the isVolatile flag in the Con-
tentValues parameter for this insert call, the new record will be created in its
volatile state. This API can help a browser to implement incognito download
(Section 3.6).
APIs for delegates. First, Maxoid introduces persistent private state, which
is a directory in internal storage (/data/data/ppriv/〈package_name〉) (Sec-
tion 3.2.2, Section 3.3.2). Second, an app can query whether it runs as a
delegate, and what initiator app it runs on behalf of.
Note that Maxoid does not support nested delegation. An app can
only make private invocations or create its own volatile records when it is an
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initiator.
3.5.2 Tracking app execution context
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 already cover implementation of Maxoid
views for file system and system content providers. This section discusses how
Maxoid tracks whether an app is running normally or on behalf of others,
which requires modification to the following system components.
1. Activity Manager Service. A delegate can only make normal in-
vocations which make the invoked apps also delegates of the same initiator
(invocation-transitivity in Section 3.2.4). If an initiator invokes another app,
Maxoid checks the flag in the intent and the intent filters to decide whether
it invokes a delegate. (Currently, if the invoked app already has an instance
running, but not on behalf of the current initiator, that instance will be killed.)
An intent’s direct destination may be a system component, like ResolverAc-
tivity which shows a list of candidate apps when the user opens a file. In
this case, ResolverActivity is considered as an intent channel rather than an
app instance. When Activity Manager Service starts a new activity, Maxoid
passes information about the app and its initiator to Zygote.
2. Zygote. When forking a new process, Zygote checks the parameters
and passes them to the kernel sysfs interface. It manages Aufs branches and
mounts Aufs in the process’ mount namespace to switch views of the file system
(see Section 3.3).
3. Kernel. 1) We add a sysfs interface for Zygote to communicate app
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and initiator information to the process’ task_struct. 2) Maxoid emulates
loss of network connection for delegates by returning error code ENETUNREACH
in the connect system call (similar to AppFence [HHJ+11]). 3) Direct Binder
IPC for a delegate is restricted to trusted system services and system content
providers, its initiator and delegates of the same intiator.
4. System content providers. We modified 3 system content providers
(User Dictionary, Downloads and Media) to support Maxoid (see Section 3.4).
In addition, to fully disable a delegate’s network access, returning an error code
in connect is not sufficient, because a delegate may request Download Provider
to fetch files from the web for it, potentially leaking sensitive data via the
requested URL. Therefore, Maxoid also emulates a network error in Download
Provider for download requests from delegates. Nonetheless, a delegate may
still add or update entries in the database for existing files, because that does
not access network.
5. Other system services. Bluetooth Manager Service and Telephony
Provider are modified to prevent delegates from sending data via Bluetooth
or SMS services. Clipboard Service is modified to create separate clipboard
instances for delegates.
3.5.3 User interface
We modify the system’s Launcher to improve usability. 1) The user
may start a delegate on behalf of an initiator, without the initiator invoking
it. For instance, Maxoid allows the user to start Camera as Email’s delegate by
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dragging Email’s icon into an “Initiator” drop target before clicking Camera’s
icon. 2) By dragging the icon of A into a “ClearVol” drop target, the user can
clear the volatile state of A. 3) By dragging the icon of A into a “ClearPriv”
drop target, the user can clear Priv(xA) for all x.
3.6 Maxoid use cases
Out of the 77 data processing apps we analyzed in Section 3.1, only
three (DocuSign, EasySign and ThinkTI Document Converter) cannot work
when they run as delegates, due to loss of network connection. We describe
five use cases of Maxoid, where the first four secure initiators to use those
unmodified data processing apps, and the last improves the delegate’s usability
with minimum code change.
Securing Dropbox. Dropbox stores files on a directory in external storage.
We use the Maxoid manifest to specify this directory to be private, and a filter
saying that any intent from Dropbox with VIEW action (indicating the user
clicking a file) is private, i.e., to invoke a delegate. Thus, other apps cannot see
the files unless invoked by the user clicking a file from Dropbox. Dropbox sees
the delegates’ modifications under EXTDIR/tmp. Without modifying Dropbox’s
source code, we require the user to manually upload the modified file if it
is desired, from EXTDIR/tmp. After that, the user can clear V ol(Dropbox) to
remove any undesired changes.
Even though Dropbox does not invoke camera apps, the user can start
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a camera app as Dropbox’s delegate using the Launcher (Section 3.5.3), and
take a private photo for Dropbox.
Securing Email attachments. We use a filter to specify that VIEW intents
are private. As a result, when the user clicks the “VIEW” button on the
attachment, the invoked app will be Email’s delegate. (The user can still
intentionally save the file to external storage and Downloads Provider, by
clicking the “SAVE” button.)
The user can also start an app via Launcher as Email’s delegate without
Email invoking it.
Enhancing Browser’s incognito mode. The Browser app uses Android’s
DownloadManager API (a wrapper of Downloads Provider’s API) to download
files. We extend this API to allow an initiator to specify whether a requested
download from it should be stored in the public state or its volatile state. Then,
we add 1 line of code for Browser, such that downloads from an incognito tab
are stored in the volatile state, while downloads from a normal tab are stored
in public state. When the user clicks a download complete notification, a
proper app will be started as a delegate of Browser if this download is from
an incognito tab. This functionality is supported by our Downloads Provider.
The downloaded file, the corresponding entry in Downloads Provider, and any
updates by the delegate depending on this download will be discarded when
the user clears V ol(Browser) and Priv(xBrowser). To extend incognito mode to
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a QR code reader app, the user can start it as Browser’s delegate using the
system’s Launcher.
Wrapper app. We write an app which does nothing but holding sensitive
documents. It can be used as an initiator to force“real apps”into a system-wide
incognito mode by clearing the volatile state after use.
Using delegates’ persistent private state. Maxoid supports unmodified
delegate apps. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, delegate apps that are aware of
Maxoid can also be modified for better usability. EBookDroid6 is an open-
source app for viewing and managing documents. It stores recent documents
and bookmarks in its private database. We modify 45 lines of code to make use
of the persistent private state. When it runs normally, it stores new entries for
recent files or bookmarks to a database in nPriv; when it runs as a delegate, it
stores new entries in pPriv, and shows a list of recent files merged from both
nPriv and pPriv.
3.7 Performance
We measure performance overhead added by Maxoid, on a Nexus 7
tablet, which has 2GB of DDR3L RAM and 1.5GHz quad-core Qualcomm







4KB files 1MB files
read write append read write append
initiator 0 0
delegate 0 7.5% 31.7% 58.7% 4.8% 18.1% 52.8%
Table 3.3: Microbenchmark overheads for CPU-bound operations and file sys-
tem, compared to Android. Read – read files; Write – create and write to files;
Append – append to the original files to double their sizes.
Setup
User Dictionary Provider
insert update query 1 word query 1k words delete
initiator 1.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.2% 1.0%
delegate 8.1% 16.1% 5.6% 13.7% 17.3%
Table 3.4: Microbenchmark overheads for User Dictionary Provider, compared
to Android. Size of table: 1000 rows. Query 1 word is done by specifying the
word ID in the URI; query 1k words is selecting all words in the database.
overhead to initiators. For delegates, Maxoid does not add overhead for CPU-
intensive computations, only for I/O operations, i.e., file and content provider
operations.
3.7.1 Microbenchmarks
CPU-bound operations. We measure the time for performing matrix mul-
tiplications. Maxoid adds no overhead to initiators and delegates, compared
to unmodified Android.
File system. Maxoid uses a single branch at any internal or external mount
point for initiators, thus incurs no overhead for initiators. However, it uses
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two branches at each internal or external mount point for delegates, except the
persistent private state. We measure the performance of Aufs for delegates,
on a microbenchmark app that uses its internal file storage. The results are
shown in Table 3.3. We test operations including read, write and append.
Before append operations for delegates, the original files are are on a read-
only branch, and the append operations copy them to the writable branch,
resulting in large overhead. However, the overhead could be reduced if a
block-level copy-on-write file system (as opposed to file-level) were used; we
choose Aufs for features that ease our prototype development.
User Dictionary Provider. We measure the slowdown for content provider
operations, using the User Dictionary Provider as an example. The slowdowns
for both initiators and delegates are shown in Table 3.4. The baseline is an
unmodified Android OS. Slowdowns for the initiator are negligible. For del-
egates, updates are executed before there are entries in the delta table, so
that copy-on-write will happen; queries are executed after updates, so that
both primary and delta tables will be involved. Maxoid adds less than 18%
overhead for delegates.
3.7.2 Macrobenchmarks
Download and Media Providers. We measure the time for 1) download-
ing 100 1KB files, using DownloadManager, and 2) scanning 100 image files and




to public state to volatile state
Time download 7.29±0.39 7.13±0.28 7.23±0.21
(s) image 1.54±0.02 1.54±0.02 1.55±0.02
Table 3.5: Times for 1) downloading 100 1KB files, and 2) scanning 100 780KB
image files and storing the metadata to Media Provider.
the baseline is an unmodified Android. For Download Provider, our tester app
can request the downloaded files to be saved in either public or volatile state;
in both cases, the tester app runs as an initiator to access the network. For
Media Provider, the tester app first runs as an initiator to store metadata into
public state, then runs as a delegate to store metadata into volatile state. The
overhead is negligible for all cases.
Application benchmarks. We measure the latency of performing several
application-specific tasks, as listed in Table 3.6. Our experiments show that
Maxoid’s impact on user-perceivable latency of these tasks is very small. This
is because the typical usage of many mobile apps does not involve data-
intensive operations, and Maxoid does not add overhead to UI-related and
CPU-intensive workload. For example, the time for reading a 1.6 MB PDF








open a 1.6 MB file 1213±27 1207±20 1221±14
in-file search 3206±57 3218±80 3197±50
CamScanner process a scanned page 7338±323 7420±298 7446±249
CameraMX
take a photo 1214±41 1251±44 1255±90
save an edited photo 1829±89 1855±59 1897±73
Table 3.6: User-perceivable latency of performing various tasks using different
apps.
3.8 Discussion
We discuss the applicability of Maxoid’s model to other mobile plat-
forms, and the limitations of Maxoid.
3.8.1 Applicability to other platforms
The state model of Maxoid applies to app-centric platforms, which
treat apps as different principals. Such platforms provide storage abstractions
for both private and public storage, where private data can only be accessed
by the owning app, and public data are shared by apps. For example, like
Android, Windows Phone 8 assigns each app an isolated private directory,
and exposes external storage as a shared resource subject to coarse-grained
access control. Similarly, iOS provides each app a private directory for file
storage; it does not have a shared file system, but instead provides high-level,
device-wide shared resources such as photos and contacts. FireFox OS is a
platform that runs mobile apps written in Web code; apps have private storage
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options such as IndexedDB, and share public resources like the SD card and
contacts.
In principal, Maxoid’s model is generic and can be used in all those plat-
forms. However, implementing the model would be platform-specific. Maxoid
leverages Android’s unified data abstractions – files and content providers –
to minimize modifications. Since iOS does not provide a shared file system,
the Maxoid-style multi-branch external storage solution is unnecessary; on the
other hand, different techniques would be needed to support volatile entries in
the photo gallery.
3.8.2 Scope and limitations
Use cases. Maxoid is targeted at cases where delegates are short-lived fore-
ground tasks, so network disruption and state divergence are not likely to cause
usability issues. Maxoid does not support scenarios where delegates need to
send initiators’ private data to remote servers for processing. Maxoid is an in-
cremental improvement over Android; it provides better security for its target
use cases, while maintaining Android’s legacy behavior for unsupported use
cases, instead of breaking them.
Code changes. Maxoid needs code changes to system content providers,
though with the help of the SQLite proxy. Content providers often involve
specific tasks that are not generic enough to be supported in a unified way.
Maxoid is not totally transparent to initiators, because the concept of volatile
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state is new. However, the API is simple enough to allow small or no modifica-
tions to initiators in many cases, enabling security enhancements that cannot
be achieved in Android.
App-defined content providers. As opposed to system content providers,
app-defined content providers are not considered shared resources. They are
often backed by private files or databases, which Maxoid treats as the pri-
vate state of their owning apps. Communicating among apps with content
providers can be considered declassification, so Maxoid does not support per-
URI volatile copies for app-defined content providers. In Android, IPC with
content providers is implemented using the low-level Binder interface, and
Maxoid’s restrictions on Binder IPC prevents delegates from leaking data (Sec-
tion 3.2.4). Modifications to data in delegate-defined content providers would
be discarded by Maxoid eventually. However, initiators are responsible for
auditing write requests to their content providers if they want to avoid unau-
thorized modifications. For example, the built-in Email app has a content
provider for attachments, but it only grants temporary, read-only access for
an entry to a document viewer on an explicit invocation; the document viewer
would need to create a copy of the attachment if the user saves changes, which
is the behavior of Adobe Reader.
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Chapter 4
Earp: abstraction and protection for structured data
Modern mobile apps communicate and exchange data with other apps
almost as much as they do with the operating system. Many popular apps now
occupy essential places in the app “ecosystem” and provide other apps with
services, such as storage, that have traditionally been the responsibility of the
OS. For example, an app may rely on Facebook to authenticate users, Google
Drive to store users’ data, WhatsApp to send messages to other users, Twitter
to publicly announce users’ activities, etc. In platforms like Android, even
some standard APIs are actually implemented in built-in apps (Section 2.3),
like the photo gallery, calendar and contacts.
Traditionally, operating systems have provided abstractions and protec-
tion for storing and sharing data. The data model in UNIX is byte streams,
stored in files protected by owner ID and permission bits and accessed via file
descriptors (Section 2.1). UNIX has a uniform access-control model for both
This chapter is based on previous publication [XHK+16] “Earp: Principled Storage,
Sharing, and Protection for Mobile Apps”, by Yuanzhong Xu, Tyler Hunt, Youngjin Kwon,
Martin Georgiev, Vitaly Shmatikov and Emmett Witchel, in the 13th USENIX Symposium
on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), Santa Clara, CA, March 2016.
My contributions to this publication include designing and implementing the protection
mechanisms for relational data, the descriptor-based APIs, the object graph library, and the
inter-app service framework.
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storage and inter-process communication: users specify permissions on files,
pipes, and sockets, and the OS dynamically enforces these permissions.
Modern mobile platforms provide higher-level abstractions to manage
structured data, and relational databases have become the de facto hubs for
apps’ internal data [SBL+14]. These abstractions, however, are realized as
app-level libraries. Platform-level access control in Android and iOS inherits
UNIX’s coarse-grained model and has no visibility into the structure of apps’
data. Today, access control in mobile platforms is a mixture of basic UNIX-
style mechanisms and ad hoc user-level checks spread throughout different
system utilities and inter-app services. Apps present differing APIs with ad
hoc access-control semantics, different from those presented by the OS or other
apps. This leaves apps without a clear and consistent model for managing
and protecting access to users’ data and leads to serious security and privacy
vulnerabilities.
In Chapter 3, we have treated some of Android’s built-in content provider
apps (e.g., Media and Downloads) as part of the platform, but also have to
modify each of them individually to support Maxoid’s security model. This is
precisely because Android does not have a platform-level abstraction for high-
level structured data, such that we could not achieve fine-grained protection
at the platform level. We now consider them regular apps, and investigate the
feasibility of using a common abstraction for them.
In this chapter, we explore the benefits and challenges of using the rela-
tional model as the unified, platform-level abstraction of structured data. We
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design, implement, and evaluate a prototype of Earp, a new mobile platform
that uses this model for both storage and inter-app services, and demonstrate
that it provides a principled, expressive, and efficient foundation for the data
storage, data sharing, and data protection needs of modern mobile apps.
First, we demonstrate how apps can use the relational model not just to
define data objects and relationships, but also to specify access rights directly
as part of the data model. For example, an album may contain multiple photos,
each of which has textual tags; the right to access an album confers the right
to access every photo in it and, indirectly, all tags of these photos.
Second, we propose a uniform, secure data-access abstraction and a new
kind of reference monitor that has visibility into the structure of apps’ data and
can thus enforce fine-grained, app-defined access-control policies. This enables
apps to adhere to the principle of least privilege [Sal74] and expose some, but
not all, of users’ private data to other apps. App developers are thus relieved
of the responsibility for writing error-prone access-control code. The unifying
data-access abstraction in Earp is a subset descriptor. Subset descriptors are
capability-like handles that enable the holder to operate on some rows and
columns of a database, subject to restrictions defined by the data owner. Our
design preserves efficiency of both querying and access control.
Third, we implement and evaluate a prototype of Earp based on Fire-
fox OS, a browser-based mobile platform where all apps are written in Web
languages such as HTML5 and JavaScript. The browser-based design enables
Earp to conveniently add its data abstractions and access-control protections
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to the platform layer while maintaining support for legacy APIs. While native
platforms like Android have different software architectures that are not ideal
to build a fully-featured Earp prototype on, we show that some of Earp’s core
concepts can be applied to them by designing and implementing Earp-style
protections to Android’s content provider framework.
Fourth, to demonstrate how apps benefit from Earp’s structured access
control, we adapt or convert several essential utilities and apps. We show how
local apps, such as the photo manager, contacts manager, and email client, can
use Earp to impose fine-grained restrictions on other apps’ access to their data.
We also show how remote services, such as Google Drive and an Elgg-based
social-networking service, can implement local proxy apps that use Earp to
securely share data with other apps without relying on protocols like OAuth.
We hope that by providing efficient, easy-to-use storage, sharing, and
protection mechanisms for structured data, Earp raises the standards that app
developers expect from their mobile platforms and delivers frontier justice to
the insecure, ad hoc data management practices that plague existing mobile
apps.
4.1 Inadequacy of existing platforms
In today’s mobile ecosystem, many apps act as data “hubs.” They store
users’ data such as photos and contacts, make this data available to other apps,
and protect it from unauthorized access. The data in question is often quite
complex, involving multiple, inter-related objects.
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Inadequate protection for storage. The coarse-grained protection for
storage (Section 2.1) in existing platforms do not provide adequate support for
mobile apps’ data management. App developers roll their own and predictably
end up compromising users’ privacy. For example, Dropbox on Android stores
all files in public external storage, giving up all protection. WhatsApp on iOS
automatically saves received photos to the system’s gallery. When the email
app on Firefox OS invokes a document viewer to open an attachment, the
attachment is copied to the SD card shared by all apps.
A systematic study [ZJ13] in 2013 discovered 2,150 Android apps that
unintentionally make users’ data—SMS messages, private contacts, browsing
history and bookmarks, call logs, and private information in instant mes-
saging and social apps (e.g., the most popular Chinese social network, Sina
Weibo)—available to any other app.
Inadequate protection for inter-app services. Services and protocols
that involve multiple apps have suffered from serious security vulnerabilities
and logic bugs [WXWC13, XBL+15, SB12, LZX+14, VGN14]. While vulnera-
bilities in individual apps can be patched, the root cause of this sorry state of
affairs is the inadequacy of the protection mechanisms on the existing mobile
platforms, which cannot support the principle of least privilege [Sal74].
Existing platforms provide limited facilities for sharing data via inter-
app services. Android apps can use content providers to define background
data-sharing services with a database-like API, where data are located via
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URIs. However, permission-based access control for content providers is coarse-
grained (Section 2.3). If a service app needs fine-grained protection, writing
the appropriate code is entirely the app developer’s responsibility. Unsurpris-
ingly, access control for Android apps is often broken [SH14,ZJ13].
Android’s URI permission mechanism may be fine-grained, but it is
a capability-passing mechanism rather than a policy enforcement mechanism
(Section 2.3). The access-control logic still resides in the application itself,
making URI permissions difficult to use for programmatic access control. An-
droid mostly uses them to involve the user in access-control decisions, e.g.,
when the user clicks on a document and chooses an app to receive it.
As also discussed in Section 2.3, iOS apps cannot directly share data
via the file system or background services.
Without principled client-side mechanisms for protected sharing, mo-
bile developers rely on server-side authentication protocols such as OAuth
that give third-party apps restricted access to remote resources. For example,
Google issues OAuth tokens with restricted access rights, and any app that
needs storage on Google Drive attaches these tokens to its requests to Google’s
servers1. Management of OAuth tokens is notoriously difficult and many apps
badly mishandle them [VGN14], leaving these apps vulnerable to imperson-
ation and session hijacking due to token theft, as well as identity misbinding




2015, a bug in Facebook’s OAuth protocol allowed third-party apps to access
users’ private photos stored on Facebook’s servers2.
Inadequate protection model. Protection mechanisms on the existing
platforms are based on permissions attached to individual data objects. These
objects are typically coarse-grained, e.g., files. Even fine-grained permissions
(e.g., per-row access control lists in a database) do not support the protec-
tion requirements of modern mobile apps. The fundamental problem is that
data objects used by these apps are inter-related, thus any inconsistency in
permissions breaks the semantics of the data model.
Per-object permissions fail to support even simple, common data shar-
ing patterns in mobile apps. Consider a photo collection where an individual
photo can be accessed directly via the camera roll interface, or via any album
that includes this photo. As soon as the user wants to share an album with an-
other app, the per-object permissions must be changed for every single photo
in the album. Since other types of data may be related to photos (e.g., text
tags), the object-based permission system must compute the transitive closure
of reachable objects in order to update their permissions. This is a challenge
for performance and correctness.
In practice, writing permission management code is complex and error-
prone. App developers thus tend to choose coarse-grained protection, which
does not allow them to express, let alone enforce their desired policies.
2http://www.7xter.com/2015/03/how-i-exposed-your-private-photos.html
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4.2 Design goals and overview
Throughout the design of Earp, we rely on the platform (i.e., the mo-
bile OS) to protect the data from unauthorized access and to confine non-
cooperative apps. Earp provides several platform-enforced mechanisms and
abstractions to make data storage, sharing, and protection in mobile apps
simpler and more robust.
• Apps in Earp store and manage data using a uniform, relational
model that can easily express relationships between objects as well as access
rights. This allows app developers to employ standard database abstractions
and relieves them of the need to implement their own data management.
• Apps in Earp give other apps access to the data via structured, fine-
grained, system-provided abstractions. This relieves app developers of the
need to implement ad hoc data-access APIs.
• Apps in Earp rely on the platform to enforce their access-control
policies. This separation of policy and mechanism relieves app developers of
the need to implement error-prone access-control code.
Efficient system-level enforcement requires the platform to have visibil-
ity into the data structures used by apps to store and share data. In the rest
of the chapter, we describe how this is achieved in Earp.
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4.2.1 Data model
UNIX has a principled approach for protecting both storage and IPC
channels, based on a unifying API—file descriptors. On modern mobile plat-
forms, however, data management has moved away from files to structured
storage such as databases and key-value stores.
In Earp, the unifying abstraction for both storage and inter-app ser-
vices is relational data. This approach (1) helps express relationships between
objects, (2) integrates access control with the data model, and (3) provides a
uniform API for data access, whether by the app that owns the data or by
other apps.
Unifying storage and services is feasible because Earp apps access inter-
app services by reading and writing structured, inter-related data objects via
relational APIs that are similar to those of storage. A service is defined by four
service callbacks (Section 4.4), which Earp uses as the primitives to realize the
relational API.
Earp uses the same protection mechanism for remote resources. For
example, a remote service such as Google Drive can have a local proxy app
installed on the user’s device, which defines an inter-app service that acts as
the gateway for other apps to access Google’s remote resources. Earp enforces
access control on the proxy service in the same way as it does with all inter-app
services, avoiding the need for protocols such as OAuth.
Earp not only makes it easier to manage structured data that is perva-
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sive in mobile apps, but also maintains efficient, protected access to files and
directories.
4.2.2 Access rights
All databases and services in Earp have an owner app. The owner has
the authority to define policies that govern other apps’ access, making Earp a
discretionary access control system. The names of databases and services are
unique and prefixed by the name of the owner app.
Earp’s protection is fine-grained and captures the relationships among
objects. In the photo gallery example, each photo is associated with some
textual tags, and photos can be included in zero, one, or several albums. Fine
granularity is achieved by simple per-row ACLs, allowing individual photos to
each have different permissions. However, per-object permissions alone can
create performance and correctness problems when apps share collections of
objects (Section 4.1).
To enable efficient and expressive fine-grained permissions for inter-
related objects, Earp introduces capability relationships—relationships that
confer access rights among related data. For example, if an app that has access
rights to an album traverses the album’s capability relationship to a photo, the
app needs to automatically obtain access rights to this photo, too. Capability
relationships only confer access rights when traversed in one direction. For
example, having access to a photo does not grant access to all albums that
include this photo.
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Capability relationships make it easy for apps to share ad hoc collec-
tions. For example, the photo gallery can create an album for an ephemeral
messaging app like Snapchat, enabling the user to follow the principle of least
privilege and install Snapchat with permissions to access only this album (and,
transitively, all photos in this album and their tags).
Capability relationships also enable Earp to use very simple ACLs with-
out sacrificing the expressiveness of access control. There are no first-class con-
cepts like groups or roles, but they can be easily realized as certain capability
relationships.
4.2.3 Data-access APIs
In Earp, access to data is performed via subset descriptors. A subset
descriptor is a capability “handle” used by apps to operate on a database or
service. The capability defines the policy that mediates access to the under-
lying structured data, allowing only restricted operations on a subset of this
data.
The holder of a subset descriptor may transfer it to other apps, possibly
downgrading it beforehand (removing some of the access rights). Intuitively,
a subset descriptor is a “lens” through which the holder accesses a particular
database or service.
Critically, the OS reference monitor ensures that all accesses comply
with the policy associated with a given descriptor. Therefore, app developers
are only responsible for defining the access-control policy for their apps’ data
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fetch all contents in an album find photos in the album witha certain tag
multiple query operations join on multiple tables
Figure 4.1: Platform- and library-level representations of structured data in
Earp.
but not for implementing the enforcement code.
Capability relationships make access rights for one object dependent on
other objects. This is a challenge for efficiency because transitively computing
access-control decisions would be expensive. To address this problem, apps can
create subset descriptors on demand to buffer access-control decisions for future
tasks. For example, an app can use a descriptor to perform joins (as opposed to
traversal) to find all photos with a certain tag, then create another descriptor
to edit a specific photo based on the result of a previous join. The photo
access rights are computed once and bound to the descriptor upon its creation.
Earp thus enjoys the benefits of both the relational representation (efficient
joins) and the graph representation (navigating a collection to enumerate its
members).
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To facilitate programming with structured data, Earp provides a library
that presents an object graph API backed by databases or inter-app services
(see an example in Figure 4.1). This API is functionally similar to the Core
Data API in iOS, but each internal node is mapped to a platform-level data
object under Earp’s protection. This API relieves developers of the need to
explicitly handle descriptors or deal with the relational semantics of the un-
derlying data.
4.2.4 Choosing the platform
Web languages such as HTML5 and JavaScript have recently become
popular in mobile app development for their portability across platforms.
Browser-based mobile/Web platforms (e.g., Firefox OS, Chrome, and univer-
sal Windows apps) support this programming model by exposing high-level
resource abstractions such as “contacts” and “photo gallery” to Web apps, as
well as generic structured storage like IndexedDB; they are implemented in
a customized, UI-less browser runtime, instead of app-level libraries. All re-
source accesses by apps are mediated by the browser runtime, although it only
enforces all-or-nothing access control.
For our Earp prototype, we chose a browser-based platform, Firefox OS,
allowing us to easily add fine-grained protection to many new and legacy APIs.
Earp also retains coarse-grained protection on other legacy APIs (e.g., raw
files), allowing us to demonstrate Earp’s power and flexibility with substantial
apps (Section 4.6).
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It is possible to adapt Earp to a conventional mobile platform like An-
droid. For storage, we could port SQLite into the kernel and add access-control
enforcement to system calls; alternatively, we could create dedicated system
services to mediate database accesses and enforce access-control policies. Non-
cooperative apps would be confined by the reference monitor in either the
kernel, or the services. For content providers, we could modify framework
to support capability relationships, and require apps to provide unforgeable
handles that are similar to subset descriptors when they access data in con-
tent providers. In Section 4.8, we show the design and implementation of a
framework for Earp-style content providers.
4.3 Data storage and protection
UNIX stores byte streams in files protected by owner ID and permission
bits and accessed via file descriptors. Earp stores structured data in relational
databases protected by permission policies and accessed via subset descriptors.
Because structured data is more complex than byte streams, Earp must provide
more sophisticated protection mechanisms than what is needed for files. Before
describing these mechanisms, we give a brief overview of the relational data
model and how it’s used in Earp.
4.3.1 Data model
Earp represents structured data using a relational model. The same







Figure 4.2: A relational representation of structured data. We show the entire
data set and a subset chosen by a combination of row and column filtering. Re-
lationships across tables are always bidirectional, but capability relationships
are unidirectional as indicated by solid arrows.
back end of this API can be, respectively, a database or a service provided by
another app.
Each data object in Earp is a row in some table, as shown in Figure 4.2.
An object in one table can have relationships with objects in other tables. For
example, a photo object is a row in the photo table with a column for raw image
data, several columns for EXIF data (standard metadata such as the location
where the photo was taken), and a relationship with the tag table, where tags
store textual notes. Storing tags in a separate table allows photos to have
an arbitrary number of tags that can be queried individually. Relationships
in Earp are standard database relationships, as summarized below, but the
concept of a capability relationship (Section 4.3.2) is a new contribution and
the cornerstone of efficient access control in Earp.
Relationships have different cardinalities. For example, the relation-
ship between a photo and its tags is 1-to-n from the photo to its tags, or,
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equivalently, n-to-1 from the tags to the photo. 1-to-1, or, more precisely
(1|0)-to-1, is a special case of n-to-1. For example, each digital camera has a
single product profile which may or may not be present in the photo’s EXIF.
Logically, the relationship between albums and photos is n-to-n, be-
cause a photo can be included in multiple albums and an album can contain
multiple photos. Like many relational stores, Earp realizes n-to-n relation-
ships by adding an intermediate table. In our example, we call the inter-
mediate table album data. The album-album data relationship is 1-to-n, and
the album data-photo relationship is n-to-1. All four tables are illustrated in
Figure 4.2.
4.3.2 Access rights
Access control lists. Each database in Earp is owned by a single app. Rows
have very simple access control lists (ACLs) to control their visibility to other
apps. Each row is either public, or private to a certain app. If a table does
not have an AppId column, it can be directly accessed only by the owner of the
database. If an Earp table has an AppId column, its value encodes the ACL:
zero means that the row is public, positive n means that the row is private to
the app whose ID is n. Any app can read or write public rows. Without an
appropriate capability relationship (see below), apps can only read or write
their own private rows.
Relationships create challenges for ACLs because they are traversed
at run time and their transitive closure may include many objects. If ACLs
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were the only protection mechanism, an app that wants to share a photo with
another app would have to modify the ACLs for all tags—either by making
each ACL a list containing both apps, or by creating a group.
Capability relationships. A relationship is logically bidirectional. For ex-
ample, given a photo, it is possible to retrieve its tags, and given a tag, it is
possible to retrieve the photo to which it is attached. In Earp, however, only a
single direction can confer access rights, as specified in the schema definition.
These capability relationships are denoted as solid arrows in Figure 4.2.
We use x 1:n y to denote a 1-to-n capability relationship between tables
x and y, which confers access rights when moving from the 1-side (x) to the
n-side (y). Similarly, x n:1 y denotes an n-to-1 capability relationship that
confers access when moving from the n-side to the 1-side. x n:1y denotes a
non-capability relationship that does not confer access rights.
In the photo gallery example,
• photo 1:n tag. Having a reference to a photo grants the holder the
right to access all of that photo’s tags, but not the other way around. There-
fore, if an app asks for all photos with a certain tag, it will receive only the
matching photos that are already accessible to it (via ownership, ACL, or
capability relationship).
• album 1:n album_data n:1 photo. The intermediate table album_data
realizes an n-to-n relationship with capability direction from album to photo.
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Having access to an album thus confers access to the related objects in al-
bum_data and photo.
album_data and tag are both on the n-side of some x 1:n y relationship,
and they are intended to be accessed only via capability relationships. For
example, each tag is attached to a single photo and is useful only if the photo
is accessible. Typically, such tables do not need ACLs.
We have not needed bidirectional capability relationships in Earp, and
they would create cycles that make the access-control model confusing. There-
fore, we decided not to support bidirectional capability relationships at the
platform level. Earp prevents capabilities from forming cycles, ensuring that
the transitive closure of all capability relationships is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG).
Groups. A group can be created in Earp by defining a table with an ap-
propriate schema. For example, to support albums that are shared by a
group of apps, the app can define another table album_access, with album_-
access n:1 album. Each row in album_access is owned by one app and confers
access to an album. With this table, even if an album is private to a certain
app, it can be shared with other apps via entries in album_access.
Primary and foreign keys. Earp requires that all tables have immutable,
non-reusable primary keys generated by the platform. The schema can also
define additional keys. Therefore, the (database, table, primary key) tuple
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uniquely identifies a database row.
Cross-table relationships are represented via foreign keys in relational
databases. A foreign key specifies an n-to-1 relationship: the table that con-
tains the foreign key column is on the n-side, the referenced table is on the
1-side. If the foreign key column is declared with the UNIQUE constraint, the
relationship is (1|0)-to-1.
Earp enforces that a foreign key references the primary key of an-
other table and must guarantee referential integrity when the referenced row
is deleted3.
By default, when a referenced row is deleted, Earp sets the foreign
keys of all referencing rows to NULL. However, when some referencing rows
are no longer accessible or useful without the referenced row, the schema can
explicitly prescribe that they should be deleted. For example, when a photo is
deleted, its tags can be deleted because they are no longer accessible; it is also
reasonable to delete rows referencing the photo in album_data because they no
longer contain useful data.
4.3.3 App-defined access policies
ACLs and capability relationships are generic and enforced by Earp
once the schema of a database or service is defined. To enable more expressive
access control tailored for relational data, Earp also lets apps define schema-
3https://www.sqlite.org/foreignkeys.html
88
level permission policies on their databases and services. These policies govern
other apps’ access to the data.
A policy defines the following for each table:
1. AppID and default insert mode.
2. Permitted operations: insert, query, update, and/or delete.
3. A set of accessible columns (projection).
4. A set of columns with fixed values on insert/update.
5. A set of accessible rows (selected by a WHERE clause, in addition to
ACL-based filtering).
The AppID is a number that identifies the controlling app as the basis
for ACLs, much like the user ID identifies the user as the basis for interpreting
file permission bits. The default insert mode indicates if data inserted into the
database is public or private to the inserting app.
Data access in Earp is expressed by four SQL operations—insert, query,
update, and delete—inspired by Android’s SQLite API (omitting administra-
tive functions like creating tables). Read-only access is realized by restrict-
ing the available SQL operations to query only. Control over writing is fine-
grained: for example, an app can limit a client of the API to only insert into
the database, without giving it the ability to modify existing entries.
The permission policy can filter out certain rows (e.g., private photos)
and columns (e.g., phone numbers of contacts), making them “invisible” to the
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client app. In addition, values of certain columns can be fixed on insert/update.
For example, a Google Drive app can enforce that apps create files only in
directories named by their official identifiers.
Just like the owner ID and permission bits of a file constrain the file
descriptor obtained by a user when opening a file in UNIX, the permission
policy constrains the subset descriptor (see below) obtained by a user when
opening a database. While permission bits specify a policy for all users using
coarse categories (owner, group, others), Earp lets apps specify initial permis-
sion policies for individual AppIDs, as well as the default policy. Figure 4.6 in
Section 4.6 shows examples of policy definitions.
4.3.4 Subset descriptors
Apps in Earp access databases and services via subset descriptors.
When an app opens a database or service that it owns, it obtains a full-
privilege descriptor. If it opens another app’s database or service, it obtains a
descriptor with the owner’s (default or per-app) permission policy.
Subset descriptors are created and maintained by Earp; apps manip-
ulate opaque references to descriptors. Therefore, Earp initializes descriptors
in accordance with the database owner’s permission policy, and apps cannot
tamper with the permissions of a descriptor (though descriptors can be down-












d0: initial descriptor via opening the
database (bold lines denote a join.)




var d0 = navigator.openDB('sys/gallery');
var cursor = d0.joinTransClosure(['album','album_data',
'photo', 'tag'], where); // join
cursor.onsuccess = function(event) {
  ... // navigate to a row (the first bold line above)
  // d1: descriptor for photo in cursor's current row
  var d1 = cursor.getSelfDesc('photo');
  // d2: descriptor for the current photo's tags
  var d2 = cursor.getRefDesc('photo', 'tag');
}
directly accessible entries indirectly accessible entries
Figure 4.3: A database join using an initial subset descriptor, then creating
new descriptors to represent subsets of the result. The figure includes a visual
depiction of the data accessible from the different descriptors.
Efficiently working with descriptors. An example of working with de-
scriptors is shown in Figure 4.3. The app receives descriptor d0 when it opens
the database. It can use d0 to access albums or photos as permitted by their
ACLs. The code in Figure 4.3 will succeed in performing a join using d0 be-
cause Earp verifies that all tables can be reached by traversing the capability
relationships from a root table (album in this case), and that entries in different
tables are related via corresponding foreign keys.
However, using d0 is not always efficient for all tasks, because access
rights on some objects can only be computed transitively. To minimize ex-
pensive cross-table checks, an app can create more descriptors that directly
encode computed access rights over transitively accessible objects. Once such
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a descriptor is created, the app can use it to access the corresponding objects
without recomputing access rights. In Figure 4.3, when the app successfully
performs a query, join, or insert for a particular photo via d0, this proves to
Earp that it can access the photo in question. Therefore, Earp lets it obtain a
new descriptor d2, which allows the app to operate only on the entries in the
tag table whose foreign key matches the photo’s primary key. Access rights are
verified and bound to d2 upon its creation, thus subsequent operations on d2
are not subject to cross-table checks. Any tag created using the d2 descriptor
will belong to the same photo because d2 fixes the foreign key value to be the
photo’s primary key. As discussed in Section 4.3.5, the object graph library
automates creation and management of descriptors.
The derived descriptor d2 inherits the AppID, default insert mode, per-
mitted operations, and accessible/fixed columns from d0. However, the set of
accessible rows are recalculated to represent only the tags of a single photo,
and a new fixed-column restriction is added for the foreign key, which must
not be fixed previously.
Transferring and downgrading descriptors. An app can pass its de-
scriptor to another app, a way to delegate access to the receiving app at run
time. Transferring a descriptor generates a new copy of the descriptor in the
receiving app. We say such a copy is derived from the original descriptor.
When delegating its access rights, an app may create a downgraded
descriptor. For example, an app that has full access to an album may create
92
a read-and-update descriptor for a single photo before passing it to a photo
editor. A downgraded descriptor can also deny access to certain relationships
by making the column containing the foreign key inaccessible.
Revoking descriptors. By default, a subset descriptor is valid until closed
by the holding app. However, sometimes an app needs more control over a
descriptor passed to another app. Therefore, Earp supports transitive revo-
cation. When an app explicitly revokes a subset descriptor, all descriptors
derived from it will also be revoked, including descriptors that are copied or
transferred from it, as well as those generated based on query results. In this
way, App A can temporarily grant access to App B by passing a descriptor d
to it, then revoke App B’s copy of d (and derived descriptors) afterwards by
revoking the original copy in App A itself.
Creating relationships. A foreign key in Earp may imply access rights.
For x 1:n y, foreign keys are never specified by the app. For example, inserting
a tag for a photo can only be done via a descriptor generated for that photo’s
tags, i.e., d2 in Figure 4.3, which fixes the foreign key value. This prevents an
app from adding tags to a photo that it cannot access.
For x n:1 y, however, the app needs to provide a foreign key when cre-
ating a new row in x. For example, to add an existing photo to an album, the
app needs to add a row in album_data with a foreign key referencing the photo.
In this case, Earp must ensure that the app has some administrative rights
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over the referenced photo, because this operation makes the photo accessible
to anyone that has access to the album. An analogy is changing file permis-
sions in UNIX via chmod, which also requires administrative rights (matching
UID or root).
To create such a reference, Earp requires an app to specify the foreign
key value in the form of an unforgeable token. The app can obtain such a token
via a successful insert or query on the referenced row, provided that the row
is public or owned by the app. This proves that the app has administrative
rights over the row.
4.3.5 Object graph library
As mentioned in Section 4.2, Earp provides a library that implements
an object graph API on top of the relational data representation. Rows (e.g.,
photos) are represented as JavaScript objects. Related objects (e.g., photos
and tags) are attached to each other via object references. The corresponding
descriptors are computed and managed internally by the library. As Figure 4.1
illustrates for our running photo gallery example, an album can be retrieved
(or stored) as a graph, and searching for photos with a certain tag can be done
via a path query in this graph.
An app can use this library to conveniently construct a subgraph from
an entry object that has capability or non-capability relationships with other
objects. The lightweight nature of subset descriptors allows the library to
proactively create descriptors as the app is performing queries. Internally, the
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library automates descriptor management and chooses appropriate descriptors
for each operation. For example, it has dedicated descriptors for simple func-
tion APIs such as addObjectRef to create objects that have relationships with
existing ones, as well as APIs that facilitate more complex operations, such as:
• populateGraph: populate a subgraph from a starting node (e.g., fetch
all data from an album);
• storeGraph: store objects from a subgraph to multiple tables (e.g.,
store a new photo along with its tags);
• queryPaths: find paths in a subgraph that satisfy a predicate (e.g.,
find photos with a certain tag in an album).
4.4 Data sharing via inter-app services
In Earp, sharing non-persistent data between apps relies on the same
relational abstractions as storage. In particular, data is accessed through sub-
set descriptors that control which operations are available and which rows
and columns are visible (just like for storage). The OS in Earp interposes on
inter-app services, presents a relational view of the shared data, and is fully
responsible for enforcing access control.
Figure 4.4 illustrates inter-app services in Earp. The server app is the
provider of the data, the client app is a recipient of the data. In Earp, the
server app defines and registers a named service, implemented with four service






















Earp translates DB operations
into service callbacks
Figure 4.4: Inter-app services in Earp.
tables and clients use subset descriptors to access this “database.” Defining
virtual tables via callbacks is a standard idea, and a similar mechanism exists
in SQLite4. Earp uses a subset of this interface tailored for the needs of mobile
apps.
Virtual tables have the same relational model and are accessed through
the same subset descriptors as conventional database tables (Section 4.3). The
server app can define permission policies on virtual tables, in the same way
as for storage databases. Like conventional tables, a virtual table can have
a foreign key to another virtual table, defining a capability or non-capability
relationship.
4.4.1 Implementing a relational service API
A service is implemented by defining four service callbacks: list, add,
alter, and remove. The callbacks operate on virtual tables as follows.
4https://www.sqlite.org/vtab.html
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• list: The server app provides a list of rows in the requested virtual
table. This is the only set operation among the four callbacks. The server app
also supplies values for the ACL column of any directly accessible table. Many
use cases (Section 4.6), however, only rely on schema-level permission policies,
so the server app may simply provide a dummy public value.
• add: Given a single row object, the server app adds it to the requested
virtual table.
• alter: Given a single row object and new values for a set of columns,
the server app updates that row in the requested virtual table.
• remove: Given a single row object, the server app deletes it from the
requested virtual table.
Implementation of the service callbacks is necessarily app-specific. An
app can retrieve data in response to a list invocation from an in-memory data
structure, or fetch it on demand from a remote server via HTTP(S) requests.
For example, list for the Google Drive service may involve fetching files, while
add for the Facebook service may result in posting a status update.
4.4.2 Using a relational service API
Earp interposes on client apps’ accesses to a service and converts stan-
dard database operations on virtual tables (query, insert, update, delete) into
invocations of service callbacks. The reference monitor filters out inaccessible
rows and columns and fixes column values according to the subset descriptor
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held by the client app.
• query: Earp invokes list, then filters the result set before returning
to the client. Multi-table queries (joins) are converted to multiple list calls.
• insert: Earp sanitizes the client app’s input row object by setting the
values of fixed columns as specified in the descriptor, then passes the sanitized
row to add.
• update: Earp invokes the list callback, performs filtering, sanitizes
the new values, then invokes alter for each row in the filtered result set. This
ensures that only the rows to which the client app has access will be updated,
and that the client cannot modify columns that are inaccessible or whose values
are fixed.
• delete: Earp invokes the list callback, performs filtering, then in-
vokes remove for each row in the filtered result set.
4.4.3 Optimizing access-control checks
Earp’s strategy of active interposition to enforce access control on inter-
app services could reduce performance for certain server implementation pat-
terns. We use several techniques to mitigate the performance impact on im-
portant use cases.
Separate data and metadata. Earp’s filtering for list happens after the
server app provides the data. Therefore, if the server returns a lot of unstruc-
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tured “blob” data (e.g, raw image data associated with photos), possibly from
a remote host, access control checks could be expensive.
In the common scenario where only metadata columns are used to de-
fine selection and access control criteria, the server app can greatly improve
performance by separating the metadata and the blob data into two tables.
The metadata table is directly visible to the client apps, and Earp performs
filtering on it. The blob table is only accessible via a capability relationship
(i.e., metadata n:1 blob). The client app receives the filtered result from the
metadata table and can only fetch blobs that are referenced by the metadata
rows.
Leverage indexing and query information. Although Earp does not
require the server app to check the correctness or security of the data it returns
in response to list, the server app can significantly reduce the amount of sent
data if it already maintains indices on the data and takes advantage of the
fact that Earp lets it see the actual client operation that invoked a particular
callback.
For example, when a service exports a key/value interface, the server
app can learn the requested key from Earp and return only the value for that
key. Similarly, if the service acts as a proxy for a local database (e.g., a photo
filter for the gallery), Earp sanitizes the client requests based on the client’s
descriptor and passes the sanitized operations to the service. The service uses
Earp’s database layer, which has a safe implementation of the relational model.
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4.5 Implementation of Earp
We modified Firefox OS 2.1 to create the Earp prototype. The backend
for storage is SQLite, a lightweight relational database that is already used by
Firefox OS internally. Firefox OS supports inter-app communication based on
a general message passing mechanism. It presents low-level APIs to send and
receive JavaScript objects (similar to Android Binder IPC). Earp’s inter-app
service support is built on top of message passing, but presents higher-level
APIs that facilitate access-control enforcement for structured data (similar
to Android content providers which are built on top of Binder IPC). Our
implementation of Earp consists of 7,785 lines of C++ code and 1,472 lines
of JavaScript code (counted by CLOC5) added to the browser runtime and
libraries.
4.5.1 Storing files
There are two ways to store files in Earp. When per-file metadata
(e.g., photo EXIF data and ACLs) is needed, files can be co-located with the
metadata in a database with file-type columns. Apps store large, unstructured
blob data (e.g., PDF files) using file-type columns, and the only way for them
to get handles to these files is by reading from such columns. This eliminates
the need for a separate access-control mechanism for files. Internally, Earp
stores the blob data in separate files and keeps references to these files in the
database. This is a common practice for indexing files, used, for example, in
5http://cloc.sourceforge.net/
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Android’s photo manager and email client. Inserting a row containing files is
atomic from the app’s point of view. This allows Earp to consistently treat
data and metadata, e.g., a photo and its EXIF.
If per-file metadata and access control are not needed, an app can store
and manage raw files via directory handles. Access control is provided at direc-
tory granularity, and apps can have private or shared directories. Internally,
Earp reuses the access-control mechanism for database rows to implement
per-directory access control, simply by adding a directory-type column which
stores directory references. The permissions on a directory are determined by
the permissions on the corresponding database row.
4.5.2 Events and threads
JavaScript is highly asynchronous and relies heavily on events. There-
fore, the API of Earp is asynchronous and apps get the results of their requests
via callbacks.
Thread pool. Internally, all requests to storage and services are dispatched
to a thread pool to avoid blocking the app’s main thread for UI updates. The
thread pool handles all I/O operations for database access and performs result
filtering for inter-app services. After completing its processing of a request,
Earp dispatches a success or error event to the main thread of the app, which
invokes an appropriate callback.














Figure 4.5: Constraints on request processing order in the thread pool.
parallelism. For example, inserting a row that contains n files will be processed
by n + 1 threads, where the first n threads store the files and the last thread
inserts metadata into the database. Although processed concurrently, such an
insert request is atomic to apps, because they are not allowed to access the
files until the insert finishes. If any thread fails, Earp aborts the operation and
removes any written data.
Similarly, a request to a service can also be parallelized. For example,
when processing an update request, Earp first uses a thread to invoke the list
callback of the server app and to filter the result; for each row that passes the
filter, Earp immediately dispatches an event to invoke the alter callback. If
alter has high latency due to remote access, the server app can also parallelize
its processing, e.g., by sending concurrent HTTP(S) requests.
Request ordering. When processing requests, Earp preserves the program
order of all write requests (insert, update and delete) and guarantees that
apps read (query) their writes. The critical section (database access) of a write
waits for all previous requests to complete, while a read waits only for previous
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writes. Storing blob-type columns, as part of inserts or updates, is parallelized;
however, a read must wait for the previous blob stores to complete. Note that
an app could request an editable file or directory handle from a database
query, but Earp does not enforce the order of reads and writes on the handle.
It enforces the order when storing or replacing the whole blob using inserts or
updates. Figure 4.5 shows an example of runtime request ordering.
4.5.3 Connections and transactions
A subset descriptor is backed by a database connection or a service con-
nection. The program’s order of requests is preserved per connection. When
an app opens a database or a service, Earp creates a new connection for it.
Descriptors that are derived from an existing descriptor inherit the same con-
nection. However, the app can also request a new connection for an existing
descriptor.
Earp exposes SQLite’s support for transactions to apps. An app can
group multiple requests in a transaction. If it does not explicitly use the API
for transactions, each individual request is considered a transaction. Note that
a transaction is for operations on a connection; requests on multiple descriptors
could belong to a same transaction if they share the connection. The object
graph library uses transactions across descriptors to implement the atomic
version of storeGraph.
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4.5.4 Safe SQL interface
SQL queries require WHERE clauses, but letting apps directly write raw
clauses would create an SQL injection vulnerability. Earp uses structured ob-
jects to represent WHERE clauses and column-value pairs to avoid parsing strings
provided by apps and relies on prepared statements to avoid SQL injection.
4.5.5 Reference monitor
The reference monitor mediates apps’ access to data by creating ap-
propriate descriptors for them and enforcing the restrictions encoded in the
descriptor when processing apps’ requests. Descriptors, requests, and tokens
for foreign keys can only be created by the reference monitor; they cannot be
forged by apps. They are implemented as native C++ classes with JavaScript
bindings so that their internal representation is invisible to apps. These ob-
jects are managed by the reference counting and garbage collection mechanisms
provided by Firefox OS.
App identity. An app (e.g., Facebook) often consists of local Web code,
remote Web code from a trusted origin (e.g., https://facebook.com) specified
in the app’s manifest, and remote Web code from untrusted (e.g., advertising)
origins. Earp adopts the app identity model from PowerGate [GJS15], and
treats the app’s local code and remote code from trusted origins as the same
principal, “the app.” Web code from other origins is considered untrusted and
thus has no access to databases or services.
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Policy management. Earp has a global registry of policies for databases
and services, specified by their owners. Earp also has a trusted policy manager
that can modify policies on any database or service.
4.6 Earp use cases
To illustrate how Earp supports sharing and access-control require-
ments of mobile apps, we implemented several essential apps based on Firefox
OS native apps and utilities.
Photo gallery and editor. Gallery++ provides a user interface for orga-
nizing photos into albums and applying tags to photos (as in our running ex-
ample). With the schema shown in Figure 4.2, Earp automates access control
enforcement for Gallery++ and lets it define flexible policies for other apps.
For example, when other apps open the photo database, they are granted ac-
cess to their private photos and albums as well as public photos and albums,
but certain fields like EXIF may be excluded.
Gallery++ can also share individual photos or entire albums with other
apps (optionally including EXIF and tag information), by passing subset de-
scriptors. For example, we ported a photo editing app called After Effects to
Earp but blocked it from directly opening the photo database. Instead, this
app can only accept descriptors from Gallery++ when the user explicitly in-
vokes it for the photos she selected in Gallery++. When she finishes editing
and returns from After Effects, Gallery++ revokes the descriptor to prevent
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further access.
Contacts manager. The Earp contacts manager provides an API identical
to the Firefox OS contacts manager, thus legacy applications interacting with
the manager all continue to work, yet their access is restricted according to
the policies imposed by the Earp contacts manager.
The contacts manager stores contacts using seven tables: the main con-
tact table in which the columns are simple attributes, five tables to manage at-
tributes that allow multiple entries (e.g., contact 1:n phone and contact 1:n email),
and the final table that holds contact categories with category n:1 contact.
Categories can be used to restrict apps’ access to groups of related contacts.
Such a schema enables Earp-enforced custom policies, e.g., a LinkedIn app can
be given access only to contacts in the “Work” category, without home address
information.
Email. The Firefox OS built-in email client saves attachments to the world-
readable device storage (SD card) when it invokes a viewing app to open the
attachment.
The Earp email client allows attachments to be exported only to an
authorized viewing app, which obtain a subset descriptor to the email app’s
database. The Earp email client also supports flexible queries from the viewing
app, such as “show all pictures received in the past week,” or “export all PDF
attachments received two days ago”.
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Elgg social service and client apps. We use Elgg6, an open-source social
networking framework, to demonstrate Earp’s support for controlled sharing
of app-defined content. We customized Elgg to provide a Facebook-like social
service where users can see posts from their friends. There are three compo-
nents: the Elgg Web server, the Elgg local proxy app, and local client apps.
Client apps are not authorized to directly contact the Elgg Web server. In-
stead, they must communicate with the Elgg local app which defines a service.
This service acts as a local proxy and accesses remote resources hosted on the
Web server.
A post in Elgg is a text message with associated images. The Elgg app
maintains two virtual tables, one for the post text (called post), the other for
the images (called image), with a post 1:n image relationship.
The service callbacks use asynchronous HTTP requests to fetch data.
To optimize bandwidth usage, images are only fetched when the requesting
client app has access to the post with which they are associated.
Local access control in Earp provides a simple and secure alternative
to OAuth. The Elgg local app defines policies for other apps based on user
actions, e.g., via prompts. We implemented several client apps, and the policies
for them are shown in Figure 4.6.
• An “activity map” app can read the location column in post, but




 {post: {ops: ['query'],
         cols: ['location']},
  image: {ops: [], cols: []}} // no access
Social Collection:
 {post: {ops: ['query'],
         // WHERE clause (group='public') encoded
         // as a JS object to prevent SQL injection
         rows: {op: '=', group: 'public'}},
  image: {}} // image access implied by post
News:
 {post: {ops: ['insert'],
         fixedCols: [{category: 'news'}]},
  image: {}} // image access implied by post
Figure 4.6: Policies defined for Elgg client apps, represented as JavaScript
objects.
unavailable to it, so it cannot fetch images even for accessible posts.
• A“social collection”app gathers events from different social networks.
It can read all posts and associated images from the “public” group.
• A “news” app has insert-only access to the service, which is sufficient
for sharing news on Elgg. The policy fixes the category column of any inserted
post to be “news”, preventing it from posting into other categories.
Google Drive and client apps. The Google Drive proxy app in Earp pro-
vides a local service that mediates other apps’ access to cloud storage, avoiding
the need for OAuth. Client apps enjoy the benefits of cloud storage without
having to worry about provider-specific APIs or managing access credentials.
The proxy app presents a collection of file objects containing metadata (folder
and file name) and data (file contents) to other apps. It services requests from
client apps by making corresponding HTTPS requests to Google’s remote ser-
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vice. We have ported two client apps to use the service.
• DriveNote is a note-taking app which stores notes on the user’s
Google Drive account via the local proxy. The proxy allows it to read/write
files only in a dedicated folder. Earp enforces this policy, ensuring that queries
do not return files outside of this folder, and fixing the folder column on any
update or insert operation.
• Gallery++ is a system utility, thus the Google Drive proxy app trusts
it with access to all files. Gallery++ can scan and download all images stored
on Google Drive.
4.7 Performance
We evaluate the performance of Earp on a Nexus 7 tablet, which has
2GB of DDR3L RAM and 1.5GHz quad-core Qualcomm Snapdragon S4 Pro
CPU.
4.7.1 Microbenchmarks
We run various microbenchmarks to measure Earp’s performance for
storage and inter-app services. Figure 4.7 shows Earp’s run time relative to
Firefox OS.
DB-only workloads (contacts). We measure the time to insert new con-
tacts, enumerate 500 contacts, and find a single contact matching a name or a
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Figure 4.7: Microbenchmark results for storage and services. Smaller run time
indicates better performance.
OS which uses IndexedDB. Earp outperforms the baseline for all workloads
except enumerating contacts, where it is about only 3% slower.
Earp’ performance is explained by its (1) directly using SQLite, while
Firefox OS uses IndexedDB built on top of SQLite, (2) directly maping an
object’s fields into table columns, whereas IndexedDB uses expensive serial-
ization to store the entire object, (3) using SQLite’s built-in index support,
whereas IndexedDB needs to create rows in an index table for all queryable
fields of every object, (4) more complex data structure for contacts (six tables
as opposed to a single serialized row for the baseline), which affords sophisti-
cated access control but requires a bit more time to perform joins.
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File-only workloads. We measure the time to create/delete empty files and
write small (18KB)/large (3.4MB) files using Earp’s directory API; the base
line is Firefox OS’ DeviceStorage API. Earp has comparable performance to
the baseline, where the -11%∼4% difference in run time is due to different
implementations of these APIs. Note that the measured times include event
handling, e.g., dispatching to I/O threads and complete notification to the
app.
DB-and-file workloads (photos). The measurements include inserting
small, 18 KB, and large, 3.4 MB, photos with metadata, and retrieving them;
the baseline is inserting/retrieving the same photo files and their metadata
into the MediaDB library in Firefox OS, which uses IndexedDB. Earp largely
outperforms the baseline, mostly because of the differences between SQLite
and IndexedDB, as explained in the contacts experiments. When inserting
large photos the run time is dominated by writing files so performance is very
close (<1%) to the baseline.
Inter-app service. We measure the run time for retrieving 4,000 2 KB
messages from a different app using Earp’s inter-app service framework. The
baseline uses Firefox OS’ raw inter-app communication channel to implement
an equivalent service, where requests are dispatched to Web worker threads
(equivalent to Earp’s thread pool). Figure 4.7 shows that Earp performs




Elgg: read 50 posts 1623±102 1755± 99 8%
Elgg: upload 50 posts 5748±152 5888±117 2%
Google Drive: read 10 files 1310± 77 1392±120 6%
Google Drive: write 10 files 2828±217 2923±253 3%
Email: sync 200 emails 4725±433 4416±400 -6%
Table 4.1: Latency (msec) measured for macrobenchmarks on Earp applica-
tions.
4.7.2 Macrobenchmarks
Table 4.1 reports end-to-end latency for several real-world workloads
described in Section 4.6.
Remote services. We measure the latency of client apps (Elgg client and
DriveNote) accessing remote services (Elgg and Google Drive) by communi-
cating with local proxy apps for these services. The baseline is the local proxy
apps performing the same tasks by directly sending requests to their remote
servers. The workloads include reading/uploading fifty posts with images via
Elgg and reading/uploading ten 2KB text files via Google Drive. Table 4.1
shows that communicating with local proxy apps adds 3%∼8% latency, due to
extra data serialization and event handling.
Email. We measure the latency of downloading 200 emails. The baseline is
Firefox OS’ email app which stores emails using IndexedDB. As shown in the
“Email: sync” row of Table 4.1, Earp achieves similar performance storing the
emails in an app-defined database.
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4.8 Applicability to Android
Earp requires providing abstractions for structured data at the plat-
form level, which is not satisfied by more popular platforms like Android and
iOS (Section 2.1). However, this section discusses the feasibility of applying
some of Earp’s core concepts to Android, despite the differences in software
architecture compared to Firefox OS. We demonstrate that Earp’s model could
be partially adopted in an incremental way for native platforms like Android.
Android’s database support is provided by the SQLite library, which
uses a single file to store each entire database. This makes it difficult to directly
achieve fine-grained database access control across apps, because it would re-
quire porting SQLite into the kernel or a system service that implements access
checks, which would be a significant change to the software architecture. We
do not investigate this approach in the dissertation.
On the other hand, Android’s content provider mechanism (Section 2.2)
imposes a standard, database-like API for cross-app communications, with
mostly coarse-grained access control. In this case, the app that implements
the content provider (server app) owns all of the data, and is responsible for
defining the access control requirements when sharing data with other apps.
We can thus apply Earp’s model for inter-app services to Android content
providers.
Once content providers have structure-aware protection, we could cre-

























Figure 4.8: The EarpCP library added to Android’s content provider frame-
work. The states of subset descriptors are maintained by the library, and client
apps only hold references (handles) to descriptors.
services, in order to achieve Earp-style protection for storage. Therefore, in
principle, protecting content providers can be viewed as a general solution for
both inter-app services and storage. However, using a content provider to
mediate database accesses may add significant overhead due to the additional
inter-process communication; also, content providers do not have a strict SQL
interface, which would cause backward-compatibility issues.
4.8.1 Earp for Android content providers
As Figure 2.2 shows, access control is enforced by user-level framework
libraries for content providers. Thus we cannot enforce Earp-style access con-
trol at the platform level. Instead, we choose to add a new framework library,
EarpCP, to implement Earp-style data protection (Figure 4.8). Since the con-
tent provider app owns the data, we do not need to prevent it from bypassing
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its own access checks. This approach cannot prevent bugs in the owning app
from compromising its own access control logic, but it does prevent client apps
from bypassing the checks, and provides a common framework for structure-
aware access control for content providers.
Data objects and relationships. A data object in a content provider is
represented as a row that has several column values, similar to a row in rela-
tional databases. We say objects of the same type collectively form a virtual
table. Suppose the previous photo gallery example (Figure 4.2) is implemented
as a content provider, then albums, photos and tags can be represented as three
different virtual tables. Note that virtual tables are not necessarily backed by
an SQLite database; even if they are, there may not be a one-to-one mapping
between virtual tables and database tables.
Content providers use different URIs to locate data objects. A URI
either identifies a collection of objects (optionally with query parameters to
filter the result), or a single object (typically with a unique ID as part of
the URI). Normally, each virtual table has one standard format to identify
a single row, with the ID as a path segment in the URI; for example, con-
tent://gallery/photos/12 may represent the photo with ID=12. However,
there are often multiple ways to identify a collection of rows for the same vir-
tual table; for example content://gallery/photos and content://gallery/-
albums/3/photos may represent all photos and photos belonging to the album

















direct access URI: /photosdirect access URI: /tagsdirect access URI:
Figure 4.9: URIs and capability relationships in the photo gallery example.
The common prefix of all URIs (content://gallery) is omitted.
a URI, which allows us to conveniently track relationships between different
types of objects.
The EarpCP library requires the content provider to specify the infor-
mation about virtual tables, including the URI formats for single objects or
collections. Then the content provider needs to annotate cross-table relation-
ships, where each relationship is specified as a rule to generate a cross-table
URI based on an exiting object. The content provider also needs to specify
whether each cross-table relationship confers access rights, i.e., whether it is a
capability relationship. For example, the album-to-photo relationship can be
specified by a rule that allows an album (e.g., content://gallery/albums/3) to
confer access rights to its photos (e.g., content://gallery/albums/3/photos).
All capability relationships should form a DAG. The gallery example is illus-
trated in Figure 4.9.
Unlike foreign keys in databases, the URI-based cross-table relation-
ships only have one direction. The content provider could implement both
album-to-photo and photo-to-album relationships with different URI formats,
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but only one of them can confer access rights, due to the DAG requirement.
Subset descriptors. In Android, a client app does not explicitly open a
content provider to get a handle for the IPC connection. Instead, it needs
to specify a content URI on every access, which is used by Android to locate
the content provider. However, Earp should allow an app to use different
descriptors to access the same content provider. The app thus needs to know
the IDs (handles) of descriptors in order to differentiate them. We create a
new API for opening, manipulating and closing descriptors, which is a standard
URI path—when the client app queries this URI, it opens the content provider
and gets a subset descriptor ID as the result; when it updates the URI with
a descriptor ID specified in a query parameter, it downgrades this descriptor
according to the new values provided in this update; when it deletes the URI
with a specified descriptor ID, it closes this descriptor.
Subset descriptors encode access rights to the content provider. To
prevent a client app from tampering with the encoded state, EarpCP is re-
sponsible for keeping the descriptor state in the content provider app. When
a descriptor is created, it is assigned a large random number, which is used
as the handle (descriptor ID) for the client app. The client app can transfer
such a descriptor by simply sending the random number to another client app.
Since the probability of correctly guessing a large random number is negligi-
ble, a client app cannot claim the possession of a descriptor unless it actually
receives it.
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Like in Earp, a subset descriptor in EarpCP encodes per-table restric-
tions including permitted operations, column filtering, fixed columns, and row
filtering. Row filtering is achieved with two mechanisms: a set of directly acces-
sible URIs and additional mandatory query parameters. For example, accessi-
ble URI content://gallery/photos with mandatory query parameter ID=3 is
equivalent to accessible URI content://gallery/photos/3 without mandatory
query parameters.
In order to use a descriptor to access data in the content provider,
the client app must append the descriptor handle as a parameter to the URI.
For each query or insert operation, if requested, EarpCP will create a new
descriptor for each entry in the result that encodes access rights to just that
entry, and append the handle in the result returned to the client app. This
similar to Earp’s mechanism of deriving descriptors as shown in Figure 4.3.
Per-app permission policies. The content provider needs to specify the
access rights carried by the initial descriptor obtained upon open by each
client app. Such initial access rights are the permission policy for the client
app (Section 4.3.3).
4.8.2 Audio library in Media Provider
We use Android’s Media Provider as an example to demonstrate the
usage of EarpCP. It manages the user’s image, audio and video libraries. Since
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Figure 4.10: URIs and capability/non-capability relationships in the au-
dio library of Media Provider. The common prefix of all URIs (con-
tent://external/media/audio) is omitted.
pared to Earp’s photo gallery, we focus on the audio library, which has richer
structures including artists, albums, playlists and genres.
We ported Android’s audio library to use EarpCP, with minor modi-
fications such as adding artist-to-audio and album-to-audio URIs, which are
alternatives to directly using audio URIs with query parameters. The new
URIs make it more convenient for us to implement capability relationships.
The data model is shown in Figure 4.10. There are five virtual tables, con-
nected with five capability relationships and one non-capability relationship
(genre-to-audio). The capability relationships enable collection sharing based
on artists, albums or playlists, which transitively grant access to member audio
files. The non-capability relationship allows query by genres, but the result
will include only the audio files that are already accessible.
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w/o EarpCP w/ EarpCP slowdown
create audio library 950±31 972±29 2%
browsing audio library 439±30 471±27 7%
Table 4.2: Time (msec) measured for running benchmark workload with and
without EarpCP.
Passing a descriptor for an artist to another app will transitively grant
the receiving app access to the albums and audio files of this artist. These
objects need different URIs to locate, all of which are allowed by the capabil-
ity relationships. In comparison, Android’s URI permission mechanism only
allows passing capability over a particular URI.
Performance. We measure the performance overhead added by EarpCP for
the audio library, on the same Nexus 7 tablet as used in Section 4.7. We use a
benchmarking client app that performs read/write operations. The workload
includes 1) creating an audio library with metatata for 200 fake audio files,
which are organized in 20 albums from 20 artists, and 2) retrieving the entire
audio library created in the previous step by browsing through all artists,
albums and audio files.
Table 4.2 shows the comparison of running the workload with and with-
out EarpCP protection. EarpCP adds 2% overhead for creating the audio li-
brary and 7% for browsing. These overheads are low because EarpCP does
not need extra IPC round trips to communicate the subset descriptors. In-
stead, descriptor handles are piggybacked on regular URIs sent to the content




Related work of this dissertation includes systems that use information
flow techniques to confine untrusted code, as well as efforts to make access
control fine-grained and more flexible in mobile platforms. We also discuss
systems that use related techniques in scenarios other than mobile platforms.
5.1 Information flow
Maxoid’s confinement model is a form of information flow control that
keeps data secure when processed by untrusted code. In fact, invoking un-
trusted code on sensitive data is a classic security problem that has been
addressed by several desktop/server systems, such as language-level decentral-
ized information flow control (DIFC) [ML97, CF07, LGV+09, AGL+12], OS-
level DIFC [KYB+07, EKV+05, ZBWKM06, JAF+], PL-OS DIFC [RPB+09]
and architectural-OS information flow [TOL+11]. These systems assign secu-
rity labels to sensitive data, and control how labeled data can be propagated
across different domains. For mobile platforms specifically, a DIFC-style sys-
tem for Android is proposed in [JAF+]. Like other DIFC systems, it is not
transparent to untrusted legacy apps, since they need to be written in a way
that explicitly obey the DIFC rules.
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TaintDroid [EGC+10] is a fine-grained taint tracking system for An-
droid which detects data leakage. In order to achieve fine granularity, it mod-
ifies different layers in Android’s software stack, including the Dalvik VM.
However, the modified Dalvik VM has a security limitation, which is that
it does not detect implicit data leaks through control flows. For example, a
branching statement can leak one bit of information about the branch con-
dition, but TaintDroid does not track such leakage. A malicious app could
accumulate information via a large number of branches, constructing a high-
bandwidth channel. In contrast, Maxoid is more conservative, i.e., a delegate’s
(even in native code) output is always controlled.
There are also systems built on top of TaintDroid. AppFence [HHJ+11]
uses TaintDroid to stop apps from sending the user’s sensitive data over the
network. Like TaintDroid, it identifies system-wide sensitive data such as the
device ID and contacts as the source of sensitive data, rather than per-app
private data as in Maxoid. AppFence uses some heuristic techniques to reduce
disruptions to legacy apps, such as providing a fake value as the device ID
sent over the network. It does not control intra-device taint propagation as
Maxoid does, which would be a more severe problem if per-app private data
were also tracked and protected. CleanOS [TAB+12] uses TaintDroid to track
the propagation of an app’s sensitive data and protects them via encryption.
Unlike Android, its focus is reducing the lifetime of an app’s clear-text sensitive
data on the device.
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5.2 Flexible access control
A number of recent systems have been proposed to change the coarse-
grained, ineffective access control in existing mobile platforms. Before Android
6.0, apps could only request permissions at install time, but there have been
research systems [OMEM12, NKZ10, CNC10, BRSS11, XSA12, BGH+12] that
enable flexible runtime permission granting or revoking.
SE Android [SC13] and FlaskDroid [BHS13] add mandatory access con-
trol to Android. Systems like ServiceOS [MWL13], Bubbles [TMO+12], IPC
Inspection [FWM+11] and QUIRE [DSP+11] provide apps different access
rights when they execute in different contexts. While these systems improve
security by enforcing stricter access control, they do not provide information
flow control like Maxoid.
FlaskDroid also provides a design pattern for content providers to filter
query results for different client apps, which is based on SQL views. However,
unlike Earp, it is limited to SQLite-based content providers and does not
consider capability relationships across table. By contrast, Earp supports all
types of inter-app services, including proxies for remote servers.
Pebbles [SBL+14] is another TaintDroid-based system, which is closely
related to Earp. It modifies Android’s SQLite and XML libraries and uses
TaintDroid to discover app-level data structures across different types of stor-
age, at the cost of considerable overhead in certain workloads. Pebbles relies
on developers using certain design patterns consistently to infer the structure
123
of data and it is implemented in app-level libraries. In contrast, Earp explicitly
requires apps to expose their structures to the platform, and its enforcement
is part of the platform.
While Pebbles and Earp make data objects fine-grained for protec-
tion purpose, there are also systems that make the security principals fine-
grained, which is a practice of privilege separation. AdSplit [SDW12] and Ad-
Droid [PFNW12] split an app and its untrusted advertising into separate pro-
cesses, while FlexDroid [SKC+16] achieves privilege separation for third-party
libraries using hardware-based fault isolation. These techniques are orthogonal
to Maxoid and Earp, and similar approaches can enable Maxoid delegates to
use advertising in a separate process without network disruption.
πBox [LWG+13] is an Android-based platform that has an extend sand-
box that spans the user’s device and the cloud. It can confine untrusted apps
with network access limited to a trusted cloud. It thus requires that all apps’
servers must be deployed on the trusted cloud. Similar approaches might help
address the limitation that Maxoid must block network for delegates. However,
the required trusted cloud does not exist for commodity mobile platforms.
5.3 Related techniques for other platforms
Maxoid and Earp have also been influenced by some other systems that
are not designed for mobile platforms. We discuss related techniques used in
these systems.
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Using different views of data for security. Solitude [JSDG08], Api-
ary [PN10] and Mbox [KZ13] use union file systems for application fault con-
tainment or sandboxing in Linux. The design of file system support in Maxoid
is inspired by these systems, but our goals and approaches are suited for mobile
apps’ collaboration on sensitive data.
Fine-grained protection in databases. Earp heavily relies on relational
databases. Traditional access control systems for relational databases [BL08,
BJS96, FSG+01, OSM00, J+09, RMSR04, GB14] are based on users or roles
with relatively static policies. More recently, IFDB [SL13] showed how DIFC
can be integrated with a relational database. Like Earp, IFDB also discusses
foreign key issues, but focuses on potential information leakage due to referen-
tial integrity enforcement. Earp’s capability relationships focus on a different
problem, and they are used to express protection requirements for mobile apps’
inter-related data objects.
Protection on Web platforms. Earp’s prototype is a browser-based plat-
form. For JavaScript code running in Web browsers, there are several sys-
tems that enable flexible policies [CGZ10, ML10, JDRC10], controlled object
sharing [MFM10, PDL+11], or confinement [SYM+14, HPD13, IW12]. While
all these systems improve access control enforcement, they do not provide
platform-level abstractions for relational data.
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Downgradable and transferable access rights. Google has proposed a
distributed authorization system, Macaroons [BPÃE+14], which allows access
rights to be delegated across protection domains, and access rights can be
downgraded by further restricting the set of accessible objects and the possible
contexts where they can be used. DCAC [XDH+14] uses hierarchically-named
attributes to represent access rights held by processes, where an attribute can
be downgraded to its child attributes and delegated to other processes. While
Earp’s subset descriptors share similarities with these mechanisms, the rela-
tional model and capability relationships can enable more expressive policies.
Native relational stores. Like Earp, there are previous efforts to make
relational data directly supported by the OS, notably Microsoft’s cancelled
project WinFS1. WinFS contains a database engine to natively support SQL,
and files/directories are implemented on top of the database. While WinFS
had fine-grained access control, it was still based on per-object permissions;
WinFS was developed before mobile platforms become popular, and tradi-
tional desktop apps that rely on files suffered performance penalties due to
database-managed metadata. Earp’s database-centric approach suits the cur-
rent practice of mobile development where databases are the de facto hub
for storage [SBL+14]. Finally, because Earp uses an unmodified file system






Security mechanisms provided by existing mobile platforms often fail to
support requirements of modern apps that frequently interact with each other.
First, existing platforms do not provide information flow control for inter-app
data exchanges, resulting in data leaks in many common scenarios; we present
Maxoid, a system that uses custom views of state to make conservative in-
formation flow confinement transparent, achieving much stronger secrecy and
integrity guarantees with backward compatibility. Second, modern apps heav-
ily rely on structured data with inter-related objects, but existing platforms’
security mechanisms are blind to such structures and relationships, causing
unprincipled, ad hoc data sharing and protection practices; we present Earp, a
new mobile platform which protects structured data—the abstraction used by
apps—at the platform level, enabling principled data protection and sharing.
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[XSA12] Rubin Xu, Hassen Säıdi, and Ross Anderson. Aurasium: Prac-
tical policy enforcement for Android applications. In USENIX
Security Symposium, 2012.
[XW15] Yuanzhong Xu and Emmett Witchel. Maxoid: Transparently
Confining Mobile Applications with Custom Views of State. In
ACM European Conference in Computer Systems (EuroSys),
2015.
[ZBWKM06] Nickolai Zeldovich, Silas Boyd-Wickizer, Eddie Kohler, and David
Mazières. Making information flow explicit in HiStar. In
USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Imple-
mentation (OSDI), 2006.
[ZJ13] Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. Detecting passive content leaks
and pollution in Android applications. In Network and Dis-
tributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2013.
139
Vita
Yuanzhong Xu was born in Hebei, China. He graduated from Shanghai
Jiao Tong University in 2011 with a B.E. degree in Information Engineering. In
August 2011, he entered the doctoral program in the Department of Computer
Science at the University of Texas at Austin, where he received an M.S. degree
in Computer Science in December 2015.
Permanent address: yxu@cs.utexas.edu
This dissertation was typeset with LATEX
† by the author.
†LATEX is a document preparation system developed by Leslie Lamport as a special
version of Donald Knuth’s TEX Program.
140
